本研究探討外部勞動市場之產業競賽誘因與企業Non-GAAP盈餘揭露行為之關聯。本文參酌Coles et al.（2018）之架構，以同業薪酬差距衡量管理者所面臨之外部競爭壓力，並檢驗產業競賽誘因是否影響企業Non-GAAP盈餘排除項目之調整程度。實證結果顯示，產業競賽誘因與Non-GAAP盈餘排除項目呈顯著負向關係，表示當外部競爭壓力較高時，管理者較少進行激進之費用或損失排除，結果較支持治理效果觀點。進一步分析發現，此負向關係主要存在於高法律訴訟風險產業及高帳面市值比公司，顯示外部法律監督與公司成長特性可能影響產業競賽誘因與Non-GAAP盈餘揭露行為之關聯。額外測試顯示，當期Non-GAAP盈餘對未來盈餘具有正向預測能力；然而，隨著產業競賽誘因提高，此一正向預測關聯反而減弱，表示未有證據顯示產業競賽誘因能進一步提升Non-GAAP盈餘資訊品質。整體而言，本研究補充產業競賽誘因與自願性財務揭露之相關文獻，並提供投資人與監理機關評估Non-GAAP盈餘資訊可信度之參考。

This study investigates the relationship between external labor market incentives and corporate voluntary disclosure strategies. Specifically, utilizing the framework of Coles et al. (2018), we construct an industry tournament incentive metric to capture the external competitive pressure faced by executives and examine its impact on the aggressiveness of non-GAAP earnings (NGE) exclusions. A statistically significant negative relationship is observed between industry tournament incentives and non-GAAP exclusions, indicating that managers subject to higher career concerns engage less in opportunistic financial packaging. This finding lends strong credence to the governance effect perspective. Further cross-sectional analyses reveal that this negative association is more pronounced in industries with high litigation risk and firms with higher book-to-market ratios. Although additional tests suggest that current NGE possesses positive predictive power for future performance, this predictability is found to attenuate as tournament incentives increase, indicating a lack of evidence that external competition further enhances structural disclosure quality. Collectively, this research enriches the literature on tournament incentives and provides critical insights for market participants evaluating the credibility of alternative performance metrics.

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