本研究探討產業競賽誘因（industry tournament incentives, ITI）與企業自願性營業費用細分揭露之關聯。研究樣本為2007年至2024年間1,640家美國公開發行公司，共17,507筆公司年度觀察值。ITI衡量方式係先計算同一Fama–French 12產業年度及依銷售額劃分之公司規模群組中，薪酬第二高執行長與焦點公司執行長之嚴格正薪酬差距，取自然對數後，再於相同Fama–French 12產業年度及銷售額規模群組內建構1至10的排序；排序愈高代表產業競賽誘因愈強；排序愈高代表產業競賽誘因愈強。費用細分揭露則以銷貨成本（COGS）與銷售、一般及管理費用（SG&A）揭露之組成項目數衡量。實證分析採負二項廣義估計方程式，納入15項公司層級控制變數、產業與年度固定效果，並使用公司層級叢聚穩健標準誤。結果顯示，ITI與整體費用細分及COGS細分皆呈顯著負向關聯；ITI排序每增加一級，預期揭露之整體費用與COGS組成項目數分別約減少0.94%與0.90%。ITI與SG&A細分之係數亦為負，但未達統計顯著。橫斷面分析顯示，當企業策略獨特性較高時，ITI與三項費用細分衡量之負向關聯均較明顯；在產業價格成本邊際異常偏高的情境下，該負向關聯則集中於整體費用與COGS細分。相較之下，以重大負向特殊項目及低條件保守性進行的檢驗，未支持預期的隱藏壞消息機制。主要結果在排除執行長更替初期、改採不同產業分類、樣本期間及樣本限制後大致維持。後果分析進一步發現，在未匹配、傾向分數匹配及熵平衡樣本中，隨ITI提高，高於產業年度中位數之費用細分所對應的條件式未來獲利差異會縮小。整體而言，實證證據較符合專屬成本解釋，而非本研究所檢驗的特定隱藏壞消息機制。本研究連結產業競賽誘因與費用細分揭露文獻，並提供FASB ASU 2024-03強制實施前的相關證據。由於研究設計屬觀察性研究且樣本期間早於強制實施，本文將結果解讀為條件式關聯，而非因果效果或政策福利效果。

This study examines whether industry tournament incentives (ITI) are associated with the voluntary disaggregation of operating expenses. Using 17,507 firm-year observations from 1,640 U.S. public firms over 2007–2024, the study measures ITI as a 1-to-10 rank constructed within the corresponding FF12 industry-year and sales-based size group of the natural logarithm of the strictly positive compensation gap between the focal CEO and the second-highest-paid CEO in the same Fama–French 12 industry-year and sales-based size group. Expense disaggregation is measured as the number of disclosed components of cost of goods sold (COGS) and selling, general, and administrative expenses (SG&A). Negative binomial generalized estimating equation models include 15 firm-level controls, industry and year fixed effects, and firm-clustered robust standard errors. The results show that ITI is negatively associated with total expense disaggregation and COGS disaggregation. A one-rank increase in ITI is associated with approximately 0.94% and 0.90% decreases in the expected numbers of disclosed total expense and COGS components, respectively. The association with SG&A disaggregation is negative but statistically insignificant. Cross-sectional tests show that the negative association is more pronounced when firms have greater strategy distinctiveness and, for total and COGS disaggregation, when industries have unusually high price-cost margins. In contrast, tests based on negative special items and low conditional conservatism do not support the predicted bad-news-concealment channel. The principal findings persist across CEO-transition exclusions and several alternative industry classifications, sample periods, and sample restrictions. A consequences analysis further shows that the conditional profitability difference associated with above-industry-year-median expense disaggregation becomes smaller as ITI increases in unmatched, propensity-score-matched, and entropy-balanced samples. Overall, the evidence is more consistent with proprietary-cost considerations than with the specific concealment mechanisms examined. The findings extend the ITI and expense-disaggregation literatures and provide pre-implementation evidence relevant to ASU 2024-03. Because the research design is observational and predates mandatory implementation, the results are interpreted as conditional associations rather than causal or welfare effects.

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