本研究探討工會力量對企業 Non-GAAP 盈餘揭露行為之影響。過去研究多從資本市場、公司治理或監管角度探討 Non-GAAP 盈餘揭露，較少關注勞工與工會等非股東利害關係人所扮演的角色。本文以 2004 年至 2020 年美國上市公司為樣本，檢驗工會力量是否影響公司揭露 Non-GAAP 盈餘之可能性及其調整激進程度。實證結果顯示，工會力量愈強，公司揭露 Non-GAAP 盈餘之可能性愈低；而在已揭露 Non-GAAP 盈餘之公司中，工會力量愈強，其調整激進程度愈低。進一步分析顯示，上述關聯在獲利公司、資產規模較大公司及員工人數較少公司中較為明顯。整體而言，本研究補充非股東利害關係人與自願性財務揭露之相關文獻，並提供工會力量影響企業 Non-GAAP 盈餘揭露行為之實證證據。

Labor unions are important non-shareholder stakeholders that may influence managers' voluntary financial reporting decisions. While prior studies have primarily examined Non-GAAP earnings disclosures from the perspectives of capital markets, corporate governance, and regulatory oversight, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of labor unions. This study investigates whether labor union strength affects firms' Non-GAAP earnings disclosure behavior. Using U.S. publicly listed firms from 2004 to 2020, the empirical results show that stronger labor unions are associated with both a lower likelihood of disclosing Non-GAAP earnings and less aggressive Non-GAAP earnings adjustments. These relationships are more pronounced among profitable firms, large firms, and firms with fewer employees. Overall, the findings suggest that labor unions influence managers' voluntary disclosure decisions through both bargaining pressure and monitoring effects.

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