隨著公司治理議題日益受到重視，董事及經理人薪酬制度被視為連結經營績效與股東利益之重要治理機制。然而，既有研究對薪酬與公司績效之關係尚未取得一致結論，且不同治理結構可能影響薪酬誘因之實際效果。特別是在家族企業中，家族成員兼具所有者與經營者角色，使薪酬是否仍能有效發揮激勵功能、並與公司績效維持一致性，成為值得深入檢驗的治理議題。
本研究以2005年至2024年間的台灣上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討董事及經理人薪酬與公司績效之關係，並進一步分析家族企業是否對此關係具有調節效果。研究結果顯示，董事及經理人薪酬與公司會計績效（ROA）呈顯著正向關係，支持薪酬具有激勵效果。然而，薪酬與市場績效（Tobin's Q）之關聯並不顯著，顯示薪酬未必能直接反映於市場評價。此外，在家族企業之調節效果方面，實證結果顯示家族企業對薪酬與公司績效關係之影響並未呈現一致方向。部分模型顯示家族企業可能弱化薪酬與績效之關聯性，部分模型則呈現正向調節效果，且部分結果未達統計顯著水準，顯示家族控制對薪酬激勵效果之影響可能受到薪酬類型、管理職位及績效衡量方式等因素影響。本研究有助於增進對家族企業治理特性之理解，並為企業設計高階管理階層薪酬制度提供實證參考。

As corporate governance issues have attracted increasing attention, director and manager compensation has been regarded as an important governance mechanism for aligning firm performance with shareholder interests. However, prior studies have not reached a consensus on the relationship between compensation and firm performance, and the effectiveness of incentive schemes may vary across different governance structures. In family firms, where family members often simultaneously assume the roles of owners and managers, whether compensation can still function as an effective incentive mechanism and remain aligned with firm performance becomes an important governance issue worthy of further examination.
This study investigates the association between director and manager compensation and firm performance and the moderating effect of family firm by using a sample of publicly listed and over-the-counter firms in Taiwan from 2005 to 2024. The empirical results indicate that director and manager compensation is positively associated with accounting performance (ROA), for both family and non-family firms, supporting the incentive effect of compensation. However, no significant relationship is found between compensation and market performance (Tobin’s Q), suggesting that compensation may not be directly reflected in market valuation. In addition, it does not reveal a consistent influence of family firms on the relationship between compensation and firm performance. While some models indicate that family firms may weaken the compensation–performance link, others suggest a positive moderating effect, and several results are statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that family firms may partially substitute compensation incentives with family monitoring and long-term relationships, highlighting that the effectiveness of compensation systems varies across different governance structures. This study contributes to a better understanding of the governance characteristics of family firms and provides practical implications for the design of compensation systems for directors and top managers.

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