本篇研究主要探討公部門貪腐對於公司價值及財務績效的影響。本研究包含美洲、歐洲、非洲、澳洲及亞洲等４９個國家在２０００年至２００８年的全球資料。我們利用Berger and Ofek (1995)年所提出的超額價值作為衡量公司價值的指標，並利用ROA及ROE作為衡量公司財務績效的指標。研究目的在於了解各國公部門貪腐程度是否會對公司(私部門)的價值及財務績效造成影響。
　　針對公司價值及財務績效的影響因子，過去學者往往針對多角化及其他因子加以探討。近十年來，學術上指出貪腐對國家經濟成長、投資及生產效率等具有負面的影響 (Leite and Weidmann 1999, Lambsdorff 2003)。因此，我們試圖討論貪腐是否對公司價值及財務績效也會有負面影響。模型當中，我們除了考慮貪腐的影響，同時我們也納入多角化及其他控制變數，並針對全球性的資料加以分析。研究結果指出，貪腐確實會對非國際化公司有價值減損現象，並且也發現在具有產業多角化的公司，貪腐對公司價值所造成的負面影響更大。另外，我們也發現貪腐對於公司的財務績效具有負面效果，這些結論大致上合乎我們的預期。

This paper examines the effects of public corruption on firms’ value and financial performances on global samples. We use global data from 49 countries including America, Europe, Africa, Australia, and Asia for the period between 2000 and 2008. We use excess value which was developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) as a measure of firms’ value. Likewise, we utilize ROA and ROE as measures of firm’s financial performances. Our major goal is to investigate whether public corruption, a macro-environmental factor, will exert influences on private firms’ value and financial performances.
When it comes to studies on factors influencing firms’ value and financial performances, previous scholars often take diversification and other factors into consideration. In the past ten years, evidences show that corruption exerts a negative impact on the economic growth of a country, investment, productivity and so forth (Leite and Weidmann 1999, Lambsdorff 2003). Therefore, we try to investigate whether corruption has negative impacts on firms’ value and financial performances. In our model, not only do we consider the impacts of corruption, but we also include diversification effects and other control variables. Evidences show that public corruption has significantly value-reducing impacts on domestic firms. Meanwhile, we observe that the value-reducing effect from corruption would be greater on industrially diversified companies. Moreover, we also find a negative relationship between public corruption and firms’ financial performances. Those conclusions, in general, correspond to our anticipations.

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