相對績效評估 (Relative Performance Evaluation, RPE) 為高階主管薪酬契約中用以排除不可控外生衝擊的重要設計。近年全球政經環境不確定性升高，使企業績效噪音增加，董事會在薪酬規劃上可能更依賴能濾除外生干擾的衡量方式，本研究旨在探討經濟政策不確定性是否促使企業提高 RPE 使用程度。
本研究以 2014 至 2024 年並排除受疫情極端波動干擾之特殊年份台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，整合 TEJ 財務資料、公司治理資訊與高階主管薪酬數據，採全球經濟政策不確定性指數 (GEPU) 衡量年度政策不確定性，並以公司 ROA 及產業 ROA 中位數 INDROA 作為相對績效評估之衡量指標。本研究預期，當政策不確定性上升時，企業薪酬對相對績效之敏感度顯著提高，顯示董事會在外部經濟環境不確定時更傾向利用 RPE 以減少不可控因素對績效衡量的干擾。進一步分析指出，此效果受產業特性之調節，在非科技產業（傳統產業）群組中尤為顯著，顯示該類企業在不確定環境下，薪酬契約之 RPE 濾除功能易發生退化而產生同業趨同。整體而言，本研究補充過去文獻關於薪酬契約在政策不確定性情境下如何調整。

This study examines how global economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects executive compensation contracts regarding Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE). Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms from 2014 to 2024 (excluding COVID-19 anomalies), we utilize TEJ financial data and the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (GEPU) to perform fixed-effects regressions.
The empirical results show that while firms normally use RPE to filter out industry noise, heightened policy uncertainty deconstructs this mechanism. Increased EPU forces executive pay and peer performance into a positive herd convergence due to information asymmetry. This contract deterioration is pronounced in traditional non-technology sectors, whereas technology firms maintain superior independence and adaptability under shocks.

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