| 研究生: |
林淑卿 Lin, Shu-Chin |
|---|---|
| 論文名稱: |
銀行股權結構、代理問題與經營績效關聯性之研究 A Study of Bank Ownership Structure, Agency Problems and Operating Performance |
| 指導教授: |
楊朝旭
Young, Chaur-Shiuh |
| 學位類別: |
碩士 Master |
| 系所名稱: |
管理學院 - 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班 Graduate Institute of Finance (on the job class) |
| 論文出版年: | 2016 |
| 畢業學年度: | 104 |
| 語文別: | 中文 |
| 論文頁數: | 45 |
| 中文關鍵詞: | 股權結構 、董監持股比例 、代理問題 、利益掠奪假說 |
| 外文關鍵詞: | ownership structure, directors and supervisors shoreholding, agency problem, entrenchment hypothesis |
| 相關次數: | 點閱:101 下載:0 |
| 分享至: |
| 查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報 |
本研究以35家國內銀行為對象,期間自2005年到2013年非平衡的追蹤資料(panel data)進行回歸分析。迴歸結果顯示,銀行規模、自有資本比率及經濟狀況與銀行的經營績效有顯著的正向關係;而與逾期放款比率(NPLR)有顯著的負向相關,顯示銀行的資產規模愈大、自有資產比率(淨值比率)愈高、總體的經濟情況愈好,則銀行的經營績效就愈好,逾期放款比率就愈低。其次,證據也顯示,銀行大股東持股比例、董監事持股比例及董監事持股質押比例,均與經營績效呈現顯著負相關,代表當大股東持股比例、董監事持股比例及董監事持股質押比例增加,則銀行經營績效顯著愈差,此實證結果支持利益掠奪假說(Entrenchment Hypothesis),即董監事持股比例愈高,代理問題愈嚴重。最後,本研究亦發現,公營銀行的逾放比率顯著較高,顯示公營銀行的管理階層可能有較高的代理問題。
This study used 35 domestic banks unbalanced panel data of 2005-2013 to investigate the relevance of ownership structure and performance. The regression results show the size of the bank, equity ratio and economic conditions toward operating performance have a significant positive correlation and toward non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) have a significant negative relationship. Furthermore, this evidence also verified that the proportion of the largest shareholder, directors and supervisors holding ratio and equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors toward operating performance are significant negative correlation. This representative the higher of directors and supervisors shareholding ratio and the directors and supervisors shareholding pledge ratio, the bank's operating performance is worse. The empirical results support entrenchment hypothesis. That is, the higher the proportion of shareholding of directors and supervisors, the more serious the agency problem. However, this study has not found statistically significant relation between ownership structure and NPLR. Finally, the results also indicate that the government-owned banks have a significant higher non-performing loan ratio (NPLR). It implies that public bank's management may have a higher agency problem.
參考文獻
中文
李佩恩,2003,「銀行獲利性分析-Panel TAR 實證研究」,輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
呂青樺、沈中華,2006,「影響大陸地區銀行獲利能力與風險的因素」,《中國大陸研究》,第 49 卷第 3 期,頁 119-142。
林枚萱,2006,「外資進入對中國銀行業經營績效影響之研究」,淡江大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文。
林泉源,2009,「銀行業股權結構對經營績效、財務績效與股價之影響」,輔仁管理評論,第十六卷第二期,43-76頁。
林惠文,2002,「本國銀行業股權結構、經營風險與績效關聯性之實證研究」,產業金融,117, 85-103。
黃英修,1999,「我國銀行業股權結構與經營績效相關性之探討」,成功大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。
葉銀華及邱顯比,1996「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究:代理成本理論」,台大管理論叢,第七卷第二期,頁 57-90。
楊朝旭及蔡柳卿,2003, 「總經理更換與相對績效評估」,人力資源管理學報,3(1): 63–80。
蔡佩真,2000,「公司成長資本結構與公司績效之研究—以台灣上市公司為例」,國立清華大學,經濟研究所碩士論文。
李馨蘋、黃啟倫,2009,「股權結構、關係人交易與公司績效」,中華管理評論國際學報,第十二卷第二期,1-31頁。
英文
Agrawal,A and Knoeber.C.R(1996). “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31,pp.377-397.
Beatty, Randolph P. and Edward J. Zajac(1987). “CEO Change and Firm Performance in Large Corporations: Succession Effects and Manager Effects.” Strategic Management Journal 8(4): 305–317.
Bhattacharya, P. S. and Graham, M. (2007). “Institutional ownership and firm performance: Evidence from Finland?” Working paper, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Faculty of Business and Law, Deaking University, Melbourne.
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease and C. W.Smith (1988). “Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments.” Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp.267- 291.
Bonnier, K.A. and R.F. Bruner(1989). “An Analysis of Stock Price Reaction to Management Change in Distressed Firms.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 95- 106.
Burkart, M.; D. Gromb and F. Panunzi (1997). “Large shareholders monitoring and the value of the firm.” Quaterly Journal of Economics, vol. 62, pp. 693-728.
Claessens,S.,S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang(2000). “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations.” Journal of Financial Economics 58:8-12
Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J., Saunders, A., Tehranian, H. (2007). “The impact of institutional ownership on corporate operating performance.” Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 1771–1794
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney (1996). “Causes and consequences of earnings misstatement: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC.” Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1–36.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Harry Huizinga, (1999). “Determinants of commercial bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence.” World Bank Economic Review 13, 379-408.
Demsetz, H.and K. Lehn(1985). “The Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Political Economy 3,pp.1155-1177.
Dinc, S. (2005). “Politicians and banks: political influences on government-owned banks in emerging countries.” Journal of Financial Economics 77, 453–479.
Dulacha, G.B., and G. Tower (2006), “Corporate Governance and Bank Performance: Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Kenyan Banking Sector.” Corporate Ownership Control, 4, 133-144.
Heard, James E and Howard D. Sherman (1987). “Contlicts of interest in the proxy voting system.” (Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington, DC).
Fama, E. F. and M. Jensen, (1983a). Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301−325.
Fan, P. H. and T. J. Wong (2002). “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Information of Accounting Earnings in East Asia.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, pp.401-425.
Edwards, J. & Weichenrieder, A (1999). “Ownership Concentration & Share Valuation: Evidence from Germany. “(CESifo Working Paper No193).
Elyasiani, E., and J. Jia.(2010). “Distribution of Institutional Ownership and Corporate Firm Performance.” Journal of Banking & Finance 34, 606-620.
Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle (1977). “Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation.” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 371-387
Hermalin, B. E. and M. Weisbach(1991). “The Effects of Board Composition and Direct Incentives on Firm Performance.” Financial Management 20,pp.101-112.
Himmelberg, C. P., R. G., Hubbard and D., Palia(1999). “Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance.” Journal of Financial Economics, 53, 1999, pp. 353~384.
Jensen, M.C. and W. H. Meckling(1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics 3,pp.305-360.
Jensen. M. C. and R. SW. Ruback (1983) . “Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence.” Journal of Financial Economics 1,pp.5-50,1983.
Jensen, M., (1986). “Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers.” American Economic Review 76, 323–329.
Jia, J., Sun, Q., & Tong, W. (2005). “Privatization through an overseas listing: Evidence from China’s H-share firms.” Financial Management, 34, 3–30.
La Porta, R., F. Lopezde Silanes and A. Shleifer(1999). “Corporate ownership around the World.” Journal of Finance, 54,pp.471-517.
Leech, D. and J. Leahy (1991). “Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies.” The Economic Journal, vol. 101, pp. 1418-1437.
Leland, H. E. and Pyle, D. H. (1977), “Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation.” The Journal of Finance 32, 371-387.
Lins, K.V. (2003). “Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. “ Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 159-184.
McConnell, J. J. and H. Servaes(1990). “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value”, Journal of Financial Economics 27,pp.595-612.
Morck, R, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1988). “Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis”, Journal of Financial Economics 20,pp.293-315.
Mudambi, R. y Nicosia, C. (1998) “Ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from the UK financial services industry”, Applied Financial Economics, vol. 8 pp. 175-180.
Pound, J. Proxy(1988). “Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.20,pp.237-265,1988.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny(1986).” Large shareholders and corporate control.” Journal of Political Economy 94(31), pp.461-488.
Shirley, M., & Walsh, P. (2000). “Public versus private ownership: The current state of the debate.” Working Paper No. 2420, World Bank.
Shleifer, A. (1998). “State versus private ownership.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 133–150.
Stulz, R(1988). “Managerial Control of Voting Rights, Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control.” Journal of Financial Economics 20, pp. 25-54.
Wiwattanakantang, Y. (2001). “Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Evidence from Thailand.” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 9, 323-362.
Wruck, K.H., (1989). “Equity ownership concentration and firm value: evidence from private equity financings.” Journal of Financial Economics 23, 3–27.
Xu, X., & Wang,Y. (1999). “Ownership structure and corporate governance in Chinese stock companies.” China Economic Review, 10, 75–98.
Zhang, J. (1996). “Measurement and Determinants of X-efficiency, Technological Change and Profitability in Banking. “Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Temple University.
校內:2021-07-01公開