本文以2017年至2021年為樣本期間，使用台灣上市公司宣告任命獨立董事作為樣本，探討台灣獨立董事勞動力市場中是否存在品質匹配效果，並檢驗當企業宣告任命獨立董事時市場反應為何。
實證結果顯示，台灣的獨立董事與企業間並不存在品質匹配效果，表示獨立董事加入績效不佳公司之動機非為迫於能力不佳而無法受聘於更好的企業的董事會。本文也發現台灣市場對於宣告獨立董事加入公司會給予正向反應，尤其是被定義為長期績效不佳的公司，市場給予的反應幅度更大也更好。另外，將新加入的獨立董事之個人特徵納入考量後，發現市場對於兼職席次較多、具會計專業背景及最高學歷為碩士的獨立董事加入公司的反應更佳。

Taking the independent director appointment announcements of listed companies in Taiwan from 2017 to 2021 as samples, this thesis investigates whether there is a quality matching effect in the labor market of independent directors, and examines the stock market reaction to the announcement of independent director appointments.
The ordered logit regression is used to test whether there is a quality matching effect between independent directors and the companies. Then, the cumulative abnormal stock returns are calculated through the event study method to evaluate the market reaction when the companies announce the appointment of independent directors.
The empirical results show that there is no quality matching effect in the labor market of independent directors in Taiwan, indicating that the motivation of independent directors to join companies with poor performance is not due to their poor ability. The research also finds that the Taiwan market reacts positively to independent director appointment announcements. Especially to companies with poor performance, the market reaction is better.
In addition, after considering the characteristics of newly added independent directors, the research finds that the market prefers independent directors with more directorships, accounting background, master's degree to join the company.

中文文獻
丁秀儀與翁天龍 (2013)。忙碌獨立董事可以降低公司績效波動性嗎？《證券市場發展季刊》，25(2)，161-194。
方俊儒、李秀英與龍春伶 (2008)。獨立董監事對公司績效與盈餘品質之影響－控制股東之調節效果。《會計與公司治理》，5(1)，55-80。
李冠皓 (2007)。獨立董事設置狀況與董事內部化程度之探討—以國內上市櫃公司為例。《貨幣觀測與信用評等》，68，93-96。
邱垂昌與莊清騄 (2010)。獨立董監事、公司資訊透明度與公司價值之關聯性。 《中山管理評論》。18(4)，949-1008。
陳瑞斌與許崇源 (2007)。公司治理結構與資訊揭露之關聯性研究。《交大管理學報》，27(2)，55-109。
外文文獻
Adams, R. B., Gray, S., and Nowland, J. (2011) “Does gender matter in the boardroom? Evidence from the market reaction to mandatory new director announcements, ” SSRN Electronic Journal, 55.
Agrawal, A., and Chen, M. A. (2017) “Boardroom brawls: An empirical analysis of disputes involving directors,” Quarterly Journal of Finance, 07(03).
Armstrong, C. S., Core, J. E., and Guay, W. R. (2014) “Do independent directors cause improvements in firm transparency?” Journal of Financial Economics, 113(3), 383-403.
Becker GS. (1993), Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Beasley, M. S. (1996) “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud,” The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465.
Brochet, F., and Srinivasan, S. (2014) “Accountability of independent directors: Evidence from firms subject to securities litigation,” Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 430-449.
Broihanne, M. H., Merli, M., and Roger, P. (2014) “Overconfidence, risk perception and the risk-taking behavior of finance professionals,” Finance Research Letters, 11(2), 64-73.
Brown, T. A., Sautter, J. A., Littvay, L., Sautter, A. C., & Bearnes, B. (2010) “Ethics and personality: Empathy and narcissism as moderators of ethical decision making in business students,” Journal of Education for Business, 85(4), 203-208.
Davidson, W. N., Xie, B., and Xu, W. (2004) “Market reaction to voluntary announcements of audit committee appointments: The effect of financial expertise,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 23(4), 279-293.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., and Sweeney, A. (1996) “Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An Analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1-36.
Defond, M. L., Hann, R. N., and Hu, X. (2005) “Does the market value financial expertise on audit committees of boards of directors?” Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2), 153-193.
Dou, Y. (2017) “Leaving before bad times: Does the labor market penalize preemptive director resignations?” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 63(2-3), 161-178.
Dou, Y., and Zhang, E. J. (2022) “Why do directors join poorly performing firms?” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 57(4), 1564-1590.
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., and Stulz, R. M. (2010) “Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?” Journal of Financial Economics, 97(1), 12-32.
Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., and Stulz, R. M. (2017) “Do independent director departures predict future bad events?” The Review of Financial Studies, 30(7), 2313-2358.
Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983) “Agency problems and residual claims,” The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., and Pritchard, A. C. (2003) “Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments,” The Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1087-1111.
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2005) “The impact of stock‐option compensation for outside directors on firm value,” The Journal of Business, 78(6), 2229-2254.
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2006). “Are busy boards effective monitors?” Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No. 2, 689-724.
Fich, E. M., and Shivdasani, A. (2007) “Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306-336.
Ghannam, S., Bugeja, M., Matolcsy, Z. P., and Spiropoulos, H. (2018) “Are qualified and experienced outside directors willing to join fraudulent firms and if so, why?” The Accounting Review, 94(2), 205-227.
Holmén, M., Holzmeister, F., Kirchler, M., Stefan, M., and Wengström, E. (2021) “Economic preferences and personality traits among finance professionals and the general population,” Working Paper.
Huang, H.-H., Hsu, P., Khan, H. A., and Yu, Y.-L. (2008) “Does the appointment of an outside director increase firm value? Evidence from Taiwan,” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 44(3), 66-80.
Kim, H., and Lim, C. (2010) “Diversity, outside directors and firm valuation: Korean evidence,” Journal of Business Research, 63(3), 284-291.
Kirchler, M., Lindner, F., & Weitzel, U. (2018) “Rankings and risk-taking in the finance industry,” Journal of Finance, 37(5), 2271-2302.
Lee, Y.-C., and Wang, M.-C. (2014) “Does the appointment of independent directors drive multiple effects?” The International Journal of Business and Finance Research 8(1), 69-88.
Lee, Y. S., Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt, J. G. (1999) “The value of financial outside directors on corporate boards,” International Review of Economics & Finance, 8(4), 421-431.
Levy, J. J., Richardson, J. D., Lounsbury, J. W., Stewart, D., Gibson, L. W. and Drost, A. W., (2011) “Personality traits and career satisfaction of accounting professionals,” Individual Differences Research, 9(4), 238-249.
Lin, H.-C., Huang, C.-S., and Yang, J. J. W. (2014) “Market reaction to voluntary and mandatory announcements of independent director appointments,” International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 5(1), 125–135.
Lin, S., Pope, P. F., and Young, S. (2003) “Stock market reaction to the appointment of outside directors,” Journal of Business Finance Accounting, 30(3-4), 351-382.
Luan, C.-J., and Tang, M.-J. (2007) “Where is independent director efficacy?” Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(4), 636-643.
Masulis, R. W., and Mobbs, S. (2014) “Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?” Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406-429.
Meghna, S., Dasaratha, V. R., and Abhijit, B. (2013) “Market reactions to departures of audit committee directors,” Accounting Horizons, 27 (1), 113-128.
Rosenstein, S., and Wyatt, J. G. (1990) “Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 175-191.
Schellenger, M. H., Wood, D. D., and Tashakori, A. (1989) “Board of director composition, shareholder wealth, and dividend policy,” Journal of Management, 15(3), 457-467.
Shivdasani, A., and Yermack, D. (1999) “CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis,” The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853.
Srinivasan, S. (2005) “Consequences of financial reporting failure for outside directors: Evidence from accounting restatements and audit committee members,” Journal of Accounting Research, 43(2), 291-334.
Vafeas, N. (1999) “Board meeting frequency and firm performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 53(1), 113-142.
Watts, R., and Zimmerman, J. (1986) Positive Accounting Theory, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
Wheeler, P. (2001) “The Myers-Briggs Types Indicator and applications to accounting education and research,” Issues in Accounting Education, 16(1), 125-150.
Yermack, D. (2004) “Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors,” The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281-2308.
Zahra, S. A., and Pearce, J. A. (1989) “Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model,” Journal of Management, 15(2), 291-334.