本研究檢驗雙元性結構對於擬制性盈餘品質之影響，研究對象為1997年至2008年之間的美國公司。實證結果發現當公司之領導結構為雙元性結構，其擬制性盈餘品質較差；另外也發現董事會獨立性可以正向調節，雙元性結構與擬制性盈餘品質之關係。本研究之結果顯示，由於雙元性結構權力集中，將決策制定和決策執行集於一身，使得董事會無法有效發揮監督職能，使管理者得以藉由擬制性盈餘達成管理性投機，導致擬制性盈餘品質較差。但公司之獨立董事在決策上可以提供專業建議，並提高公司治理績效及強化公司內部之監督功能，故獨立董事佔董事會之比例越高，可有效監督管理階層之運作及提升盈餘品質，並且抑止管理者操縱擬制性盈餘之投機行為，使得擬制性盈餘品質獲得改善。另外作者也加入沙賓法案針對擬制性報表增加規範之影響，結果顯示頒布沙賓法案後之年度，公司發佈擬制性盈餘之品質有獲得改善，同時也遏止雙元性結構對擬制性盈餘之負面影響，並且發現董事會獨立性之調節效果也有下降之趨勢。

This study investigates the relationship between CEO duality and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Using the firm-quarter observations of the U.S. firms from 1997 to 2008, this study finds the relationship between CEO duality and the persistence of non-GAAP earnings. Specifically, this study finds exclusions from non-GAAP earnings have larger implications for future earnings when CEO duality is present. Moreover, this study documents a positive moderating effect of board independence on the relationship between CEO duality and the persistence of non-GAAP earnings. Our evidence shows that if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, having rights of decision making and decision performance, it will severely reduce the board’s capability of monitoring. Consequently, CEO-Chair have more spaces and chances to do managerial opportunism by manipulating non-GAAP earnings, making the quality of non-GAAP earnings worse. In addition, outside boards not only provide professional suggestion, but also increase the performance of corporate governance and strengthen the monitoring functions of board. Therefore, as the proportion of independent director rises, it can prohibit the CEO-Chair’s opportunistic behavior, then making the quality of no-GAAP earnings improved. Moreover, we also find that after implementing SOX, the quality of non-GAAP earnings becomes better. The negative impact on non-GAAP earnings by CEO duality is also restrained, and the positively mitigated effect by independent boards declines.

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