本研究主旨探討公司治理與法令遵循之關聯性。本研究以2014年至2018年台灣金融業公開發行公司為樣本，檢測公司治理較佳的公司，是否法令遵循較高，因此被金融監督管理委員會裁罰的機率較低。本研究實證結果顯示，獨立董事席次比率愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率反而愈高，顯示董事獨立性並非確保金融業遵循法令的驅動因素。董事兼任經理職比率愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率會愈高，因董事兼任公司的經營管理者，將容易產生球員兼裁判的局面。董監持股比例愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率會愈高，可能董監事持股越高，權力越大，公司內部缺乏制衡的力量，因而法律遵循程度較差。大股東持股比例愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率會愈高，因股權愈集中在大股東身上，可藉由控制公司決策之便，增進自利行為，損害小股東權益。法人持股比例愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率會愈低，因法人對於經營階層的管理者監督會更加的嚴格，且外部投資人對公司的經營績效與投資報酬率要求更高，公司管理者為了經營績效更不容易發生違約風險的機率。政府機構持股比例愈高，公司受到金管會裁罰的機率會愈低，可能原因為官官相護導致的結果。

SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and law compliance. This study used the Taiwan financial industry public issuance company from 2014 to 2018 as a sample to detect whether the company with better corporate governance had higher compliance, so the probability of being penalties by the Financial Supervisory Commission was lower. The empirical results of this study show that the higher the ratio of independent directors, the higher the probability that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission, indicating that the independence of directors is not the driving factor in ensuring compliance with the law in the financial industry. The higher the ratio of director-to-management manager, the higher the chance that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission. Because the director is also the manager of the company, it will easily lead to the situation of players and referees. The higher the proportion of the directors and supervisors holding, the higher the probability that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission. The higher the shareholding of the directors and supervisors, the greater the power, the lack of checks and balances within the company, and the degree of legal compliance. The higher the shareholding ratio of the major shareholders, the higher the probability that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission. As the equity is concentrated on the major shareholders, it can improve the self-interest and damage the minority shareholders' rights by controlling the company's decision-making. The higher the legal person's shareholding ratio, the lower the probability that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission, because the legal person's supervision of the management class will be more strict, and the external investors have higher requirements for the company's business performance and return on investment. Corporate managers are less likely to run into default risk in order to behave in a business. The higher the proportion of government institutions, the lower the probability that the company will be fined by the Financial Supervisory Commission, possibly due to the results of the government officials.

Keywords: Corporate governance, law compliance, board of directors, shareholding structure, relationship trader.

INTRODUCTION
The financial industry is an industry that the government attaches great importance to in economic development and social stability. Its financial business is also a highly global industry, and it must comply with the laws and regulations of its government where local and foreign operating agencies are located. Therefore, its financial industry plays an important role in the domestic industry. As the financial industry is an important part of stabilizing financial and economic development, its capital is larger than the average industry. The main source of funds is investment from shareholders and enterprises or individuals. The composition of savings deposits, in the financial market, the role of the provider of funds and the intermediary of the capital demanders, once the financial institutions broke out of business crisis or fraud, it is likely to have a chain effect to damage the rights of customers and investors. The Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Financial Management Association) announced the list of five "systemic banks" on June 27, 2019, including CTBC Financial Holding Co., Ltd, Cathay United Bank, Taipei Fubon Commercial Bank Co., Ltd, Mega Financial Holding Company Ltd, Taiwan Cooperative Bank. Can not be reversed, otherwise it will lead to systemic risks, so it is necessary to take enforcement measures to ensure that the banking system is sound to support the development of the real economy. Therefore, corporate governance in the financial industry is also important for other industries. Therefore, the competent authorities of the government also strictly supervise and attach great importance to it, and the corporate governance system not only protects the rights of investors and shareholders but also needs to maintain financial industry fund providers and the public interest.

MATERIALS AND METHODS
This article aims to explore the relevance of corporate governance and compliance. The board of directors is the highest decision-making unit of the company, and the directors and supervisors are the operations and managers of the company. However, the degree of shareholding of these operations and managers is closely related to corporate governance and legal compliance. Corporate governance, shareholding ratio of the board of directors, shareholding structure and relationship The extent of the trader affects the relevance of the statute. The relevant literature is analyzed and explained in terms of corporate governance, compliance with laws, and relationships with traders.

RESULTS AND DISSCUSSION
In this paper, the establishment of the research hypothesis is explained, the definitions and explanations of the variables are given, the empirical models are established based on the research hypotheses and variables, and the data sources are used in this study. First, the research hypothesis is explained; secondly, through the definition of logistic regression model and variables, and then the source of research data. This study is based on the sample of publicly-issued financial companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2018, and the correlation between corporate governance and legal compliance, and the theoretical model and research hypothesis proposed in this study. 4.1 For the analysis of the narrative statistical values of the study samples, the characteristics of the data can be observed. 4.2 Correlation coefficient analysis is to study the correlation analysis between variables. 4.3 For the relationship between corporate governance and financial statement information and gold management ruling, the Logis regression model is used for verification analysis, and the results of empirical analysis are summarized.

CONCLUSION
The financial industry is an important industry for the stability of the country's economy. It is accompanied by a franchise business and is subject to supervision by specialized government agencies. It also exposes stricter examinations of corporate governance and legal compliance and related information to other general industries.

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