本篇研究探討美國公司所制定的反併購條款數量如何影響公司價值，延續了Straska, M., & Waller, H. G. (2014) 等人的研究，採取相同的指數如公司治理指數（Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A., 2003）以及管理階層鞏固指數 (Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A., 2009）等人所編制作為反併購指數的衡量指標。我們發現近十年公司治理指數對公司價值影響的方向不明確，但管理階層鞏固指數對公司價值有正向的影響，並且在針對特定公司特性，例如規模小或是低財務槓桿率的公司，正面的影響力更強。

This study examines how the number of antitakeover provisions imposed by U.S. firms affects firm value. Following “Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature.” (Straska, M., & Waller, H. G., 2014) we adopt the same indices such as the Corporate Governance Index （Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A., 2003） and the Management Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A., 2009）as measures of antitakeover indices. We found that the direction of the impact of the corporate governance index on firm value over the last decade is ambiguous, but the management entrenchment index has a positive impact on firm value, and the positive impact is stronger for companies with specific firm characteristics such as small size or low financial leverage.

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