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研究生：	彭智偉 Peng, Chih-Wei
論文名稱：	是否財務會計準則公報第151號反而誘導管理者從事過度生產行為? Does SFAS 151 Provide Perverse Incentive to Induce Manager’s Over-production Behavior?
指導教授：	簡金成 Chien, Chin-Chen 楊朝旭 Young, Chaur-Shiuh
學位類別：	博士 Doctor
系所名稱：	管理學院 - 會計學系 Department of Accountancy
論文出版年：	2011
畢業學年度：	99
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	75
中文關鍵詞：	美國財務會計準則第151號公報、過度生產、公司生命週期、實質盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞：	SFAS 151, Over-production, Firm life cycle stage, Real earnings management activities.
相關次數：	點閱：152 下載：2
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美國財務會計準則第151號公報規定：當公司實際產量低於正常產能水準時，需將未分攤的固定製造費用認列為當期的閒置產能費用，而不能再認列為存貨成本的一部分。本研究目的在探討是否在財務會計準則第151號公報實施之後，美國企業管理者會利用過度生產來避免報導閒置產能費用。本研究使用2003年至2008年美國COMPUSTAT及CRSP資料庫中的製造業公司樣本進行分析。研究發現，在財務會計準則第151號公報實施之後，美國企業管理者反而會利用過度生產行為來避免報導閒置產能費用。本研究也進一步指出，在財務會計準則第151號公報實施之後，停滯型公司相較於成長型公司，有較強的誘因從事過度生產行為以避免報導閒置產能費用。本研究具有以下的意涵：首先，美國財務會計準則第151號公報的實施，反而會誘使管理者從事過度生產行為。其次，美國財務會計準則第151號公報的實施不但無法維持財務會計準則中位性原則，反而造成停滯型公司在外部財務報導的考量下，從事扭曲的過度生產決策。

SFAS 151 stipulates that the cost of idle facilities should be recognized as current-period charges rather than capitalized as product costs when a firm’s actual production is lower than its normal level. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether managers will increase production unnecessarily during the year so as to avoid any recognition of unfavorable idle facility expenses. Using a sample of US manufacturing firms that appeared in the COMPUSTAT and CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices) during the period 2003-2008, we find that managers engage in over-production in order to avoid reporting idle facility expenses. We also find that, after the adoption of SFAS 151, stagnant firms have a stronger motivation than growth firms to engage in over-production. Taken together, our evidences imply that SFAS 151 provides perverse incentive to induce manager’s over-production behavior. Moreover, SFAS 151 fails to maintain neutral since it more severely distorts stagnant firms’ production decisions imposed by external reporting considerations.

TABLE OF CONTENTS   Page
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURE	vii
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT	5
2.1 Real earnings management	5
2.2 Real earning management through overproduction	7
2.3 Managers’ use of overproduction after the adoption of SFAS No. 151	9
2.4 The influence of differnet life cycle stags on managers’ use of overproduction after the adoption of SFAS No. 151	13
III. RESEARCH METHOD	17
3.1 Data and sample selection	17
3.2 Empirical model	18
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS	25
  4.1 Descriptive statistics	25
  4.2 Regression analysis	27
V. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE	30
  5.1 Whether firms follow an overall earnings management strategy and use a mix of real and accrual-based earnings management tools	30
  5.2 Omitting firm’s future demand	32
  5.3 Another overproduction by CPAI	33
  5.4.Whether the stock market penalizes opportunistic overproduction behavior under SFAS No.151	34
  5.5 Whether financial analysts incorporate the effects of overproduction into their forecasts of EPS under SFAS No.151	34
  5.6 The impact of overproduction on future performance and write down of assets	35
  5.7 The results by controlling the potentially underproduction	36
  5.8 Controlling three alternative effects	37
VI. CONCLUSIONS	40
REFERENCE 	42
APPENDIX 	72
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURE 
Table		Page
1.The net income difference between variable costing and absorption costing	47
2.The Comparisons between U.S. GAAP and IFRS in inventory	48
3.The earnings difference between pre-adoption of SFAS No. 151 and its post-adoption period	49
4.The earnings difference under different inventory valuation method after the adoption of SFAS No. 151 period	50
5.Sample Selection criteria	53
6.Sample distributions	54
7.Model parameters	55
8.Descriptive Statistics	56
9.Correlations among Variables	57
10.The effects of SFAS 151 on Over-production	59
11.Life Cycle Stages and the Effects of SFAS 151 on Over-production	60
12.The relationship between overproduction and accrual 	61
13.The estimation results with controlling future demand	62
14.The results by using the CPAI scales developed by Jiambalvo et al. (1997)	63
15.The regression of Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CARs) on overproduction behavior	64
16.The regression of analyst’s forecast of EPS on overproduction behavior	65
17.The impact of overproduction on future performance and write down of assets	66
18.The results by controlling the potentially underproduction	69
19.The results by controlling alternative effects	71
FIGURE		
1.Time period analyzed	52

 

                                    

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