本研究旨在探討企業剩餘產能費用與高階管理者薪酬之關聯性，並進一步分析管理者能力之調節效果。以2009年至2020年台灣上市櫃公司作為研究對象，研究結果顯示在電子業中，剩餘產能費用與高管薪酬呈現顯著負相關；在非電子業中，剩餘產能費用與高管薪酬則無顯著相關性。本研究認為，由於非電子業在台灣多為具有非技術導向、產業競爭較低、剩餘產能所需成本較低等性質之產業，導致董事會並未將產能決策後果納入高管薪酬之考量。進一步加入管理者能力調節效果後發現，在電子業中，剩餘產能費用對高管薪酬的負面影響會隨著管理者能力而降低。研究結果顯示電子業之董事會可能認為管理者能力越強，越不需要擔心未使用產能對公司績效的負面影響，因而降低剩餘產能費用之負面薪酬權重。本研究填補管理會計中產能決策後果與高管薪酬相關文獻之不足，提供台灣企業之董事會在決定高管薪酬時，是否將剩餘產能費用納入考量之證據。

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between unused capacity expenses and executive compensation. Furthermore, it is to consider the moderating effect of managerial ability. I use listed and OTC companies in Taiwan from 2009 to 2020 as the research sample. The results show that there is a significant negative correlation between unused capacity expenses and executive compensation in the electronics industry. However, in the non-electronics industry, there is no significant correlation between unused capacity expenses and executive compensation. This effect may be a result of non-electronics industries in Taiwan being mostly non-technology-oriented industries with low industrial competition and low unused capacity expenses; thus, boards of directors may not have taken the consequences of capacity decisions into consideration in executive compensation. After further adding the moderating effect of managerial ability, the negative impact of unused capacity expenses on executive compensation decreased with managerial ability in the electronics industry. The results show that boards of directors in the electronics industry may assume that the more capable managers are, the less they need to worry about the negative impact of unused capacity on the company’s performance, thus reducing the negative effect of unused capacity expenses on compensation. This study fills the gap in the literature on the consequences of capacity decision-making and executive compensation in management accounting, and provides evidence on whether boards of directors of Taiwanese companies consider unused capacity expenses when determining executive compensation.

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