為什麼某些銀行總在金融危機時自己也同時陷入危機？是什麼原因，讓它相較於其他同業顯得特別脆弱？本篇研究，觀察1998年亞洲金融風暴時，台灣上市銀行業股價報酬表現，並以此股價報酬表現為基礎，進而觀察當2007年金融海嘯發生，則台灣上市銀行業是否已有足夠的能力度過海嘯？抑或，與1998年亞洲金融風暴時一樣，在失控的洪流中載浮載沉？其實，無論隨波逐流或者勇渡風暴，其背後支撐銀行的因子究竟是什麼，才是本研究所關注者。
參考文獻後，本研究形成「風險文化假說」以及「學習假說」兩個面向作為探討路徑。「風險文化假說」的部分，實證結果顯示，台灣境內上市銀行乃高風險文化者，係指台灣銀行業經營模式，為達報酬目標不惜犧牲原有的獨家資訊（Private information）優勢，讓經營風險升高亦在所不惜。如此作法，將使得台灣境內銀行業之經營變得敏感，面臨大環境景氣波動，抵抗力低弱。「學習假說」的部分，實證結果顯示，台灣境內上市銀行並沒有文獻所提到的「學習」行為，亦即台灣境內上市銀行，錯誤一犯再犯，雖經歷兩次金融危機卻仍有重蹈覆轍的情況，經營狀況令人憂心。

Why some banks always come to a crisis when financial crisis? What’s the causes make them weaker than others? We observed stock return performance of banks in Taiwan during the 1998 financial crisis, and take stock return performance as the foundation to consider whether they can tide over the 2007 financial crisis or not.We are concerned with factors supporting banks.
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