本研究旨在探討獨立董事任期是否影響企業投資不效率，並以台灣2013至2024年上市櫃公司為實證對象。本文採用 Biddle et al.(2009)之投資不效率量數，檢驗獨董任期對資源配置偏離正常水準的影響。實證結果顯示，獨立董事任期與投資不效率呈顯著負相關，顯示任期較長的董事可憑藉對公司運作的熟悉與制度記憶，發揮較佳監督效能，抑制資源錯置與過度投資現象。進一步分組檢驗發現，該負向效果主要發生抑制過度投資的現象，而且任期較長之獨立董事抑制投資不效率的效果在資源寬鬆(高現金資源)的企業更明顯。此外，穩健性檢驗亦確認結果的一致性。本文結果除補足獨董任期與投資效率關聯之文獻缺口，亦提供台灣及類似市場公司治理機制設計之實務啟示。

This study aims to investigate whether the tenure of independent directors affects corporate investment inefficiency, using listed companies in Taiwan from 2013 to 2024 as the research sample. Following the investment inefficiency measure proposed by Biddle et al. (2009), this study examines the extent to which director tenure influences the deviation of resource allocation from optimal levels. Empirical results show that the tenure of independent directors is significantly negatively associated with investment inefficiency, indicating that directors with longer tenure, by leveraging their familiarity with the company's operations and institutional knowledge, are better able to perform monitoring functions and reduce resource misallocation and overinvestment. Further subgroup analysis reveals that the negative effect is mainly observed in the mitigation of overinvestment, and that the effect of longer-tenured independent directors on reducing investment inefficiency is more pronounced in firms with greater resource slack (i.e., high cash holdings). In addition, robustness tests confirm the consistency of the results. This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the relationship between independent director tenure and investment efficiency and provides practical implications for corporate governance mechanisms in Taiwan and similar markets.

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