本研究以2005年至2007年進行私募及現金增資的公司來探討下列幾項要點：一、以Logistic Regression Model分析家族企業與非家族企業在其各自的考量點下是否有其偏好的增資模式(私募或現金增資)？二、以t檢定檢視該增資模式對其事後的經營績效與股價報酬是否造成影響？三、以OLS Regression Model檢視私募的應募人類型及私募目的除了會對公司股價報酬產生影響外，是否亦會對經營績效產生不同程度的影響？四、上述私募應募人類型及私募目的是否會因公司為家族企業與否而對經營績效產生差異？
關於私募應募人類型，本研究參照Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007)的方法，將私募樣本區分為三種不同類型的投資人，首先將應募人分成內部人與外部人兩種類型，若該次私募當中，私募之應募者合計有50%股份為私募公司之經理層級人員、董監事及10%以上大股東認購，則視為內部人(managerial placements)樣本，反之則為外部人；接著再將外部人分為積極投資人(active investors)與消極投資人(passive investors)，如果外部應募者認購該次私募股份達50%以上，並取得董監職位者或成為10%大股東，視為積極投資人樣本，反之則為消極投資人樣本。而私募的目的，則大致可分為改善財務結構及策略聯盟等原因。
實證結果發現，非家族企業偏好以私募方式募集資金，家族企業偏好以現金增資方式募集資金，且家族企業若採以私募方式募集資金，其後續的經營績效改善幅度及股價報酬均比家族企業以現金增資方式募集資金來的好。當私募應募人類型為積極投資人或內部人時，公司的經營績效會因此有所提升；而當應募人類型為消極投資人時，公司的經營績效並不會提升，且經營績效改善幅度小於積極投資人與內部人；在私募目的方面，當私募目的為改善財務結構時，公司的經營績效會提升；此外，由於控制權的問題，私募應募人對家族企業的影響小於非家族企業，然私募目的對家族企業與非家族企業並沒有任何差異。

This study uses the sample of listed and over-the-counter firms choosing private placements and public offerings during 2005 to 2007 investigating follows. First, this study uses logistic regression model to examine how family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms choose between public offerings and private placements. Second, this study uses t-test to examine whether the choice of private placements and public offerings affects operating performance and abnormal returns under family-controlled firms? Third, this study uses OLS regression model to examine whether the types of private placement investors and purposes affect operating performance? Lastly, what the difference is between family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms under the different types of private placement investors and purposes.
As to the types of private placement investors, this study follows Barclay, Holderness, and Sheehan (2007) to classify private placement investors into three types including active investors, insider investors and passive investors. The purposes can be classified into strategic alliances, improving the financial structure, and others.
The evidence shows that non-family-controlled firms prefer choosing private placements, while family-controlled firms prefer choosing public offerings. Besides, the abnormal returns and returns on assets(ROA) is better when family-controlled firms choose private placements as compared to public offerings. Regarding the impacts of the three types of private placement investors, their impacts on ROA are differerent. Firms have better performance after private placements when the private placement investors are active investors and insider investors; however, firms do not have better performance after private placements when the private placement investors are passive investors. When the purpose is improving the financial structure, ROA is better after private placements. Lastly, the impacts of private placement investors on performance are weaker for family-controlled firms as compared to non-family-controlled firms. However, when the purpose is the same, there is no difference on performance between family-controlled firms and non-family-controlled firms.

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