This study tries to investigate and compare the alternative auctions mechanism by measure the expected buyer surplus from each mechanism. Simulation study utilizing Matlab 2015b was done using sealed second price based auction mechanism (Vickrey auction) with screening (PBS) and incentive (PBI). The manipulation in this study was the number of sellers and the performance of buyer to determine the seller’s capability in PBS mechanism. In the both alternative mechanisms the number of sellers was modified while in the PBS mechanism the accuracy of the buyer to determine seller’s capability and variance between perceived (ex-ante) and real quality of the sellers. The results indicated with higher number of sellers can generates higher expected surplus in both auction mechanisms. In the simulation of PBS mechanism, the accuracy of the buyer to determine seller’s capability and variance between perceived (ex-ante) and real quality of the sellers can lead to difference expected surplus. Finally, the results of this study found that sealed price based procurement auction with incentive was superior compare with price based auction with screening.

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