本研究以自民國94年10月11日金管會修訂相關法規後至民國99年09月01日金管會再次修正公開發行公司辦理私募有價證券應注意事項前之上市、上櫃公司作為本研究樣本，藉以檢視94年管理制度修訂後，應募人類型與公司內部人對私募股權折價幅度之影響。另外，本研究再對採私募籌資的公司，其本身所有權結構是否為家族企業進行探討，以瞭解家族企業的所有權結構對私募之定價產生之影響。研究發現：
在應募人類型對私募股權折價幅度之影響方面，當私募之應募人為內部人及策略投資人時，其折價幅度均顯著小於消極投資人，然而當私募之應募人為積極投資人，其折價幅度並未小於消極投資人；相較於多位投資人，單一投資人其折價幅度並未較小。總言之，當應募人之類型不同，其折價幅度有所差異。
在公司內部人對私募股權折價幅度之影響方面，當應募人為內部人時，其與私募股權折價幅度呈顯著負向關係，此結果顯示，內部人確實擁有比外部人更多的資訊，資訊不對稱的情況較不嚴重，使得資訊搜集成本降低，因此，折價幅度較外部人小，另外，也發現內部人於前後一年內有公開申讓股權，其折價幅度並未較大，此與國外學者Wu (2004) 、 Barclay et al. (2007)以及國內學者陳俊合、羅國華和王馨晨 (2009) 實證發現內部人存在自利動機，其結果不一致。推測可能為主管機關修訂管理辦法後所發揮之正面效果。因此，內部人並未如外界所質疑，涉及自利行為，竊取原股東資產。將內部人進一步劃分為四類：董監事、經理人、大股東及關係人，當內部人為董監事或關係人時，其對私募折價幅度均具有顯著負向影響，表示董監事未如市場上所質疑之圖利內部人、賤賣股權等現象，而當內部人為經理人與大股東時，其對私募折價幅度未達顯著影響。當私募股權樣本為虧損公司時，相較於獲利公司，虧損公司之內部人較無自利行為的產生。相較於10元以上，私募價格在10元以下之內部人較無自利行為的產生。
在家族之所有權結構對私募股權折價幅度的影響方面，家族企業與私募股權折價幅度呈正向關係，與本文預期方向不一致，且均未達顯著水準，表示當私募公司為家族企業時，相較於非家族企業，其折價幅度並未較小。且當應募人為內部人時，家族企業與私募股權折價幅度呈正向關係，與本文預期方向不一致，亦均未達顯著水準。表示當應募人為內部人時，家族企業折價幅度並未較非家族企業小。

The sample of this study includes the firms which used private placement to raise capital during the period from October 2005 to September 2010, when FSC amended related rules and regulations’ at first and again. The purposes of this study are to examine the effects of the types of investor and insider on the discount of private placement, and to invstigate the difference in discount between family-controlled and non- family-controlled firms. The findings of this study are as follows：
For the effect of the types of investor on the discount of private placement, when investors are insiders and strategists, the discount is less than passive investors. The discount of active investors is not less than that of passive investors. The discount of single investors is not less than that of multiple investors. In summary, the discount of private placement varies with different types of investor.
For the effect of insider on the discount of private placement, when private placement is offered to insider, it is significantly negative related to discount. This result indicates that insiders do gain more information than outsiders, therefore showing information asymmetry is not severe and lead to discount is less than outsiders. From the result, we also find that the discount on the insider who transfers securities within one year before and after private placement is not that great. The results are not consistent with those of Wu (2002), Barclay et al.(2007) and Chen et al.(2009), who discovered self-dealing. It is presumed that it may be due to the amendment by FSC that created this positive effect that the self-dealing disappears. Therefore, there does not exist self-dealing when the investors are insiders. Insiders are futher divided into four categories: directors and supervisors, managers, major shareholders and related parties. When insiders are directors and supervisors or related party, they are significantly negative related to discount, this result is not what people expected, such as selling shares at the price less than market price. When comparing the firms with negative earnings to the firms with profit, we find that there is less self-dealing effect of insider for the firms with negative earnings, as compared to the firms with profit. When the private placement price is less than $10, there is less self-dealing effect of insider, as compared to that greater than $10. Besides, when the private placement price is less than $10, the regression results are more consistent with those of full sample than that greater than $10.
For the effect of family-controlled firms on the discount of private placement, the family-controlled firms are positively related to the discount, but not significantly, it differs to what we expected. This indicates the discount of family-controlled firm is not less than that of non-family-controlled firm. The relation between the effect of an insider of a family-controlled firm and discount is positively related but not significantly, it differs to what we expected. This indicates the discount of family-controlled firm’s insider is not less than that of non-family-controlled firm’s.

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