「借殼上市」提供私人公司有別於傳統IPO的方式對外公開發行，透過借殼的方式，私人公司可以在相對較快、付出較低成本的情況下達到實質上市的目的。本研究蒐集從2007至2017年間在台灣借殼上市櫃的案例，總樣本為58家借殼公司其中21間為上市公司、37間為上櫃公司。另外，在總樣本中， 40家殼公司在借殼後變更換產業類別，剩下18間則繼續在殼公司原產業經營。本研究顯示殼公司之所以會成為私人公司上市的借殼標的，主要是因為在借殼前三年的財務表現及經營狀況不佳，因此導致原經營階層無心繼續經營。另外，在關於借殼後的股價波動，我們也發現相對與同產業資產規模相近的上市公司，借殼後更換產業的殼公司股價將會呈現相對波動的現象。在股價的異常表現上，我們透過事件研究法檢視借殼宣告日前後的股價表現，發現上市殼公司在借殼宣告日前後，的確存在正的異常報酬。

Reverse merger make it possible for private companies to go public through merging of listed shell firms. This method is completely different as compared to the traditional IPO process. Private firms can achieve the purpose of going public at a relatively quick rate that is relatively low cost using reverse merger. In this research, 58 reverse merger cases in the Taiwan market from 2007 to 2017 were collected. Of the 58 shell companies, 21companies are TWSE-listed, and 37 companies are TPEx-listed. In addition, 40 shell companies changed to different industries after being merged by private firms, whereas the remaining 18 shells remained in their original industries. Our research result shows that shell companies may be the target in reverse mergers mainly because of their poor financial performance and operating conditions before being merged. As a result, the original management may has no intention to continue operating the companies. Additionally, we also find that the stock price of shell companies that change their industries after reverse mergers will cause a fluctuation phenomenon compare to other similar public firms. Furthermore, we utilize the event study method to examine the abnormal returns surrounding reverse mergers. We find that a positive abnormal return exists both before and after the announcement date of a reverse merger.

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