不同公司策略型態其公司治理系統之設計應有所不同。本研究探討公司策略與公司治理之間關聯性，並進一步研究不同策略型態其最適公司治理結構之組成，若偏離該最適公司治理結構，是否對公司未來績效有負面影響。研究樣本為台灣2011至2015 上市櫃公司，透過Miles and Snow (1978) 之企業策略之分類，將樣本公司分為探勘者企業與防禦者企業。本研究得到以下結論： (1) 探勘者企業在外部董事比例、董事兼任經理人比例、經理人持股、大股東持股、外資持股上顯著高於防禦者企業。防禦者企業在董監事持股、盈餘股份偏離比、盈餘分配、採用交叉持股、金字塔結構顯著高於探勘者企業。(2) 在設計最適公司治理結構上，探勘者企業之最適公司治理設計為董事會規模大、董事兼任經理人比例高、法人持股低、盈餘股份偏離比低、不採用金字塔結構之五項變數設計，當探勘者企業公司治理設計偏離最適公司治理特性設計時，與公司績效為顯著負向影響。

This study examines the relationship between business strategy and corporate governance, and we assume that different types of business strategies will have different corporate governance designs. Also, different strategies have their own top performing corporate governance profile, and we called that the ideal profile. If a company’s corporate governance design deviated from the ideal profile, then the company’s performance has a negative effect. Data was collected from 2011 to 2015 listed companies from the stock exchange market and the over-the-counter market in Taiwan. This study uses Miles and Snow’s (1978) the prospector and defender strategies. Our results shows that: (1) Prospectors are significantly higher than defenders in outside directors, director-managers, large shareholder holdings, managerial holdings, and foreign institutional stockholdings. Defenders are significantly higher than prospectors in director and supervisor stockholdings, deviation ratios in surplus stocks, earning distribution, intersect holdings, and pyramid structures. (2) In designing the optimal corporate governance structure, the ideal profile of corporate governance design for prospectors contains five major variables: large board size, higher percentage of director-manager, low institutional shareholdings, low deviation from surplus shares, and no pyramid structure. When a prospector’s corporate governance design deviates from the optimal corporate governance design, it is significantly negatively related to corporate performance.

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