本研究以上市櫃四百多家公司自民國87年至91年止之資料為樣本，旨在探討公司股權結構、員工分紅對於公司經營績效之影響，另外在員工分紅制度下，公司管理階層因員工分紅而增加本身的表決權，則可能否決對於本身不利但對公司整體有利之決策，因此在有外部股東監督之公司其長期性績效與無外部股東監督之公司是否有差異也是本研究所要探討之範圍。本研究以普通最小平方法進行複迴歸分析與T檢定來進行假說的驗證。

　　研究結果在股權結構方面，公司內部人持股比率對於公司長短期績效皆呈顯著的正向關係，但確存有先增後減的非線性關係；大股東持股比率對於公司長短期績效大部分呈現顯著的正向的關係；機構投資者持股對於公司長短期績效大部分呈現不顯著的正向關係。此外在員工分紅方面，員工分紅率對於公司短期績效指標(ROA、ROE、EPS)皆呈顯著的正向關係，但對於長期績效指標公司股價、市場附加價值確是無顯著關係，並且對於Tobin’s Q呈負向關係，並且對於公司績效有先增後減的非線性關係。

　　最後在員工分紅制度之下，公司是否有無外部股東的監督其績效是有否有顯著的差異之檢定，其實證顯示雖然在高外部股東持股的公司其績效平均優於低外部股東持股的公司，但檢定結果確是呈現出不顯著的情況，表示外部股東對於公司管理階層營運的監督並未積極的參與。

　This study investigates the effects of ownership structure and employee’s bonus on firm’s operating performances. We use about 400 firms whose stocks are traded in markets of TSE or OTC as study samples and the study period from 1998 to 2002. Moreover, this study also examines the impact of the outside blockholders on the performances of firms which have profit-sharing plane. While the ownership awarded to managements through profit-sharing plane may reinforce the management’s voting rights. So, there is a negative aspect to be considered. Profit-sharing plan may increase management entrenchment by shifting voting rights. When managements have enough voting rights, managements can use the voting rights for managerial objectives.

　The main empirical result as follows:
1.There is significant positive relation between insider share holding ratio and firm’s performances. And it presents a significant curvilinear relation.
2.There is significant positive relation between block shareholder share holding ratio and firm’s performances.
3.There is no significant positive relation between institute share holding ratio and firm’s performances.
4.There is significant positive relation between employee’s bonus ratio and firm’s short-term performances (ROA, ROE, EPS). But there is no significant positive relation between employee’s bonus ratio and firm’s long-term performances(Stock price, MVA, Tobin’s Q).And the empirical result presents a significant curvilinear relation between employee’s bonus ration and firm’s performances.

　Finally, the empirical result of testing for the impact of the outside blockholders on the performances of firms which have profit-sharing plane displays no significant, although the firm which high outside bockholder share holding ratio has better performance than the firm which low outside blockholder share holding ratio. We consider that the outside blockholders not active supervise the management.

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