本研究基於金管會於2017 年新增修訂獨董親自出席相關規定，以2017至2021年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，探討獨董投入心力程度差異與公司價值及盈餘品質間的關聯。實證結果發現獨董平均出席率越高之企業，有較高的公司價值；獨董兼職數較多，公司價值亦較高；最後相較於獨董跨產業兼職比例低的企業，獨董跨產業兼職比例高時，其兼職數越多，應計盈餘管理程度越高，實質盈餘管理程度越低。整體來說，本研究發現不管是從公司價值的角度或是實質盈餘管理的角度，獨董均發揮其聲譽效果，對管理階層的作為更加留意；不過在一段期間後會迴轉的應計盈餘管理的部分，則是獨董的忙碌效果較為明顯。最後，本研究也針對親自出席及兼職相關法規提供驗證，表明與其訂定的精神相符合。

This study is based on the revised regulations introduced by the Financial Supervisory Commission R.O.C Taiwan (FSC) in 2017, which require independent directors to personally attend board meetings. Using a sample of listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 2017 to 2021, we examine the relationship between the differential levels of effort exerted by independent directors, firm value and earnings quality. The empirical results indicate that companies with higher average attendance rates of independent directors tend to have higher firm value. Additionally, the numbers of independent directors holding concurrent position in other companies is positively related to firm value. Furthermore, compared to companies with a low proportion of independent directors serving in multiple industries, those with a higher proportion of independent directors serving in multiple industries exhibit a higher degree of accrual-based earnings management and a lower degree of real earnings management when the companies with a greater number of concurrent independent directors. Overall, the empirical results show that from the perspective of firm value and real earnings management, independent directors contribute their reputational effect and pay closer attention to management actions. However, the busy schedule of independent directors has a more pronounced effect on the reversal of accrual-based earnings management. Finally, this study provides validation for the regulations concerning personal attendance and multiple directorships, as they align with the intended objectives.

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