簡易檢索 / 詳目顯示

研究生: 廖思婷
Liao, Ssu-Ting
論文名稱: 董事會特性與實質盈餘管理
Board Characteristics and Real Earnings Management
指導教授: 楊朝旭
Yang, Chau-Shiu
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 會計學系
Department of Accountancy
論文出版年: 2011
畢業學年度: 99
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 161
中文關鍵詞: 董事會應計項目盈餘管理實質盈餘管理
外文關鍵詞: board of directors, accrual-based earnings management, real earnings management
相關次數: 點閱:152下載:4
分享至:
查詢本校圖書館目錄 查詢臺灣博碩士論文知識加值系統 勘誤回報
  • 過去文獻在探討盈餘管理誘因和實質盈餘管理之間的關係時,忽略考量公司治理所扮演的角色,另一方面,先前研究在探討實質盈餘管理和公司治理之間的關係時,則忽略考量盈餘管理的誘因。本研究結合上述二脈文獻,將實質盈餘管理、從事實質盈餘管理的誘因以及董事會特性的調節效果進行整合性的探討。
    本研究以2003年至2009年美國上市櫃公司作為樣本,檢驗具有零盈餘門檻和前期盈餘誘因的公司是否較易於從事實質盈餘管理,並檢驗董事會的獨立性、勤勉度與專業性三種特性是否有助於減輕因為零盈餘門檻和前期盈餘誘因而從事實質盈餘管理的情形。實證結果發現,具有零盈餘門檻或前期盈餘誘因的公司較有可能從事實質盈餘管理。在董事會特性的調節效果方面,本研究發現當董事會的成員具備較高的獨立性或專業性時,對於有誘因符合零盈餘或前期盈餘門檻之公司所從事的實質盈餘管理,具有一定程度的抑制效果。

    One stream of research on the incentives for earnings management and real earnings management does not consider the role of corporate governance, while another stream of research on real earnings management and the role of corporate governance does not consider the incentives for earnings management. By integrating the two streams of research this paper focus on the relationships among real earnings management, the incentives for engaging in real earnings management, and the moderating effect of board characteristics.
    Using all U.S. firm-year listed companies during the sample period of 2003-2009, this study examines whether firms with incentives to meet “zero earnings” and “last year’s earnings” thresholds will engage in more real earnings management. Furthermore, I also investigate whether the independence, diligence, and professionalism of the board of directors will mitigate degree of real earnings management when managers have the incentives to meet specific earnings benchmarks. The study provides evidence supporting that firms with incentives of avoiding negative earnings or maintaining earnings growth engage in more real earnings management. With regard to the role of board characteristics, the results indicate that board members with higher independence or more professionalism lead to less real earnings management of firms which have specific earnings goals. These findings suggest that to enhance the board independence and professionalism is important in limiting managerial opportunism behavior associated with real earnings management.

    1.INTRODUCTION 1 1.1.The Background and Motivation of this Study 1 1.2.The Purpose of this Study 6 1.3.The Framework of this Study 7 2.LITERATURE REVIEW 8 2.1.Earnings Management 8 2.1.1.The Motivations of Earnings Management 8 2.1.2.The Type of Earnings Management 16 2.1.3.The Choice of Earnings Management (Accrual-Based versus Real Earnings Management) 25 2.2.Corporate Governance 27 2.2.1.The Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Earnings Quality 27 2.2.2.The Effect of Corporate Governance Mechanism on Decision-Making 33 2.3.Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 35 2.3.1.Independence and the Role of the Board and Audit Committee 35 2.3.2.Diligence and the Role of the Board and Audit Committee 40 2.3.3.Professionalism and the Role of the Board and Audit Committee 41 3.HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 45 3.1.Hypotheses Development 45 3.1.1.Real Activities Manipulation around Earnings Benchmarks 45 3.1.2. The Role of the Board of Directors 47 3.2.Research Design 53 3.2.1.Earnings Management Metrics 53 3.2.2.Regression Model 59 3.2.3.Control Variables 67 3.2.4.Sample Selection 72 4.EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 79 4.1.Empirical Results of Hypothesis 1 (H1) 79 4.1.1.Descriptive Statistics of Hypothesis 1 (H1) 79 4.1.2.Correlation Analysis of Hypothesis 1 (H1) 81 4.1.3.Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 1 (H1) 83 4.2.Empirical Results of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 (H2&H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2009 93 4.2.1.Descriptive Statistics of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 (H2&H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2009 93 4.2.2.Effectiveness Test on Board Characteristics (H2&H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2009 97 4.2.3.Correlation Analysis of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 (H2&H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2009 100 4.2.4.Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 4 (H2&H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2009 102 4.3.Empirical Results of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 4 (H2-H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2006 112 4.3.1.Descriptive Statistics of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 4 (H2-H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2006 112 4.3.2.Effectiveness Test on Board Characteristics (H2-H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2006 116 4.3.3.Correlation Analysis of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 4 (H2-H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2006 120 4.3.4.Multiple Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2 to Hypothesis 4 (H2-H4) Based on Sample Period of 2003-2006 122 4.4.Additional Tests and Analyses 136 5.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 143 5.1.The Conclusions of this Study 143 5.2.The Contributions of this Study 145 5.3.The Limitations and Future Research of this Study 146 REFERENCES 149

    Abbott, L. J., S. Parker, and G. F. Peters. (2004). Audit committee characteristics and restatements. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(1), pp. 69-87.
    Abdullah, S. N., and N. M. Nasir. (2004). Accrual management and the independence of the boards of directors and audit committees. Journal of Economics and Management, 12(1), pp. 1-31.
    Adiel, R. (1996). Reinsurance and the management of regulatory ratios and taxes in the property—casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 22, pp. 207-240.
    Aharony, J., C. Lin, and M. Loeb. (1993). Initial public offerings, accounting choices, and earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research, 10, pp. 61-82.
    Ahmed, A., and S. Duellman. (2007). Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 43(2-3), pp. 411-437.
    Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb. (2004). Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, pp. 315-342.
    Archambeault, D. S., F. T. Dezoort, and D. R. Hermanson. (2008). Audit committee incentive compensation and accounting restatements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), pp. 965-92.
    Ayers, B., J. Jiang, and E. Yeung. (2006). Discretionary accruals and earnings management: An analysis of pseudo earnings targets. The Accounting Review, 81(3), pp. 617-652.
    Baber, W., P. M. Fairfield, and J. A. Haggard. (1991). The effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: The case of research and development. The Accounting Review, 66(4), pp. 818-29.
    Barton, J., and P. Simko. (2002). The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. The Accounting Review, 77(Supplement), pp. 1-27.
    Bartov, E. (1993). The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation. The Accounting Review, 68(4), pp. 840-855.
    Bartov, E., D. Givoly, and C. Hayn. (2002). The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(2), pp. 173-204.
    Baxter, P., and J. Cotter. (2009). Audit committees and earnings quality. Accounting and Finance, 49, pp. 267-290.
    Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review, 71, pp. 443-465.
    Beasley, M. S., and S. E. Salterio. (2001). The relationship between board characteristics and voluntary improvements in audit committee composition and experience. Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(4), pp. 539-570.
    Beatty, A., S. L. Chamberlain, and J. Magliolo. (1995). Managing financial reports of commercial banks: the influence of taxes, regulatory capital, and earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 33, pp. 231-261.
    Bebchuk, L., Y. Grinstein, and U. Peyers. (2006). Lucky directors. Working Paper. Harvard University Law School.
    Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 23(2), pp. 13-35.
    Beekes, W., P. Pope, and S. Young. (2004). The link between warnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board composition: Evidence from the UK. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(1), pp. 47-59.
    Belsley, D., E. Kuh, and R. Welsch. (1980). Regression Diagnostics. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons.
    Bens, D., V. Nagar, and M. H. Franco Wong. (2002). Real investment implications of employee stock option exercises. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(2), pp. 359-393.
    Blacconiere, W. G., R. M. Bowen, S. E. Sefcik, and C. H. Stinson. (1991). Determinants of the use of regulatory accounting principles by savings and loans. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14, pp. 167-201.
    Bowen, R. M., S. Rajgopal, and M. Venkatachalam. (2008). Accounting discretion, corporate governance and firm performance. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25, pp. 351-405.
    Bradbury, M. E., Y. T. Mak, and S. M. Tan. (2006). Board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and abnormal accruals. Pacific Accounting Review, 18(2), pp. 47-68.
    Brown, L. D. (1998). Managerial behavior and the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. Working Paper. Georgia State University.
    Burgstahler, D., and I. Dichev. (1997). Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, pp. 99-126.
    Bushee, B. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73(3), pp. 305-333.
    Cahan, S. F. (1992). The effect of antitrust investigations on discretionary accruals: A refined test of the political-cost hypothesis. The Accounting Review, 67, pp. 77-95.
    Carcello, J. V., C. W. Hollingsworth, A. Klein, and T. L. Neal. (2008). Audit committee financial expertise, competing corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings management in a post-SOX world. Working Paper. University of Tennessee, Clemson University, and New York University.
    Carcello, J. V., D. R. Hermanson, T. L. Neal, and R. A. Riley, JR. (2002). Board characteristics and audit fees. Contemporary Accounting Research, 19(3), pp. 365-384.
    Carcello, J., and T. Neal. (2000). Audit committee composition and auditor reporting. The Accounting Review, 75(4), pp. 453-67.
    Carcello, J., and T. Neal. (2003). Audit committee characteristics and auditor dismissals following "new" going-concern reports. The Accounting Review, 78(1), pp. 95-117.
    Chen, K. Y., R. J. Elder, and Y. M. Hsieh. (2007). Corporate governance and earnings management: The implications of Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for Taiwanese listed companies. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), pp. 73-105.
    Cheng, S. (2004). R&D expenditures and CEO compensation. The Accounting Review, 79(2), pp. 305-27.
    Chi, W., C. Liu, and T. Wang. (2009). What affects accounting conservatism: A corporate governance perspective. Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 5, pp. 47-59.
    Chtourou, S. M., J. Bédard, and L. Courteau. (2001). Corporate governance and earnings management. Working Paper. Fsegs, SFAX, Tunisia and Université Laval, Canada.
    Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. (2008). Real and accrual-based earnings management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley periods. The Accounting Review, 83(3), pp. 757-787.
    Cohen, D. A., and P. Zarowin. (2010). Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, pp. 2-19.
    Cohen, D., and P. Zarowin. (2009). Earnings management and excess investment: Accrual-based versus real activities. Working Paper. New York University and Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
    Collins, J. H., D. A. Shackleford, and J. M. Wahlen. (1995). Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings and taxes. Journal of Accounting Research, 33, pp. 263-291.
    Cullinan, C. P., H. Du, and G. B. Wright. (2008). Is there an association between director option compensation and the likelihood of misstatement? Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 24, pp. 16-23.
    Davidson, R., J. Goodwin-Stewart, and P. Kent. (2005). Internal governance structures and earnings management. Accounting and Finance, 45, pp. 241-267.
    DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner. (1994). Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, pp. 113-143.
    DeAngelo, L. E. (1981). Auditor size and audit quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3, pp. 183-199.
    DeAngelo, L. E. (1988). Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance: The use of accounting performance measures in proxy contests. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 10, pp. 3-36.
    Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. (2000). Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners, and regulators. Acounting Horizons, 14(2), pp. 235-250.
    Dechow, P. M., and R. G. Sloan. (1991). Executive incentives and the horizon problem: an empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 14, pp. 51-89.
    Dechow, P., A. Hutton, and R. Sloan. (1996). Economic consequences of accounting for stock-based compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(Suppl.), pp. 1-20.
    Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50, pp. 344-401.
    Dechow, P., R. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review, 70, pp. 193-225.
    Dechow, P., S. Kothari, and R. Watts. (1998). The relation between earnings and cash flows. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25(2), pp. 133-69.
    Dechow, P., S. Richardson, and I. Tuna. (2003). Why are earnings kinky? An examination of the earnings management explanation. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(2-3), pp. 355-384.
    DeFond, M. L., and C. W. Park. (1997). Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, pp. 115-139.
    DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. (1994). Debt covenant violation and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, pp. 145-176.
    Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. (1999). Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business, 72, pp. 1-33.
    Desai, H., C. Hogan, and M. Wilkins. (2006). The reputational penalty for aggressive accounting: Earnings restatements and management turnover. The Accounting Review, 81(1), pp. 83-112.
    Dhaliwal, D., V. Naiker, and F. Navissi. (2006). Audit committee financial expertise, corporate governance and accruals quality: An empirical analysis. Working Paper. University of Arizona, The University of Auckland, and Monash University.
    Dolly King, T. H., and M. M. Wen. (2010). Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking. Journal of Banking &Finance.
    Drobetz, W., A. Schillhofer, and H. Zimmermann. (2004). Corporate governance and expected stock returns: Evidence from German. European Financial Management, 10, pp. 267-293.
    DuCharme, L. L., P. H. Malatesta, and S. E. Sefcik. (2000). Earnings management: IPO valuation and subsequent performance. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, pp. 369-396.
    Erickson, M., and S. W. Wang. (1999). Earnings management by acquiring firms in stock for stock mergers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27, pp. 149-176.
    Ettredge, M., D. Simon, D. Smith, and M. Stone. (1994). Why do companies purchase timely quarterly reviews? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18(2), pp. 131-55.
    Fama, E. F., M. C. Jensen. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp. 301-325.
    Fama, E., and J. Macbeth. (1973). Risk, return and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), pp. 607-36.
    Fields, T. D., T. Z. Lys, and L. Vincent. (2001). Empirical research on accounting choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, pp. 255-307.
    Friedlan, J. M. (1994). Accounting choices by issuers of initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11, pp. 1-33.
    Garven, S. A. (2009). The effect of board and audit committee characteristics on real earnings management: Do boards and audit committees play a role in its constraint? Working Paper. The University of Alabama.
    Gaver, J., K. Gaver, and J. Austin. (1995). Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, pp. 3-28.
    Goh, B. W. (2009). Audit committees, boards of directors, and remediation of material weaknesses in internal control. Contemporary Accounting Research, 26(2), pp. 549-79.
    Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, pp. 107-155.
    Gong, G., H. Louis, and A. X. Sun. (2008). Earnings management, lawsuits, and stock-for-stock acquirers' market performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46, pp. 62-77.
    Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. (2005). The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 40, pp. 3-73.
    Guidry, F., A. Leone, and S. Rock. (1999). Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 26, pp. 113-142.
    Gunny, K. (2005). What are the consequences of real earnings management? Working Paper. University of California.
    Gunny, K. A. (2010). The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(3), pp. 855-888.
    Hagerman, R. L., and M. E. Zmijewski. (1979). Some economic determinants of accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1(2), pp. 141-161.
    Hansen, J. C. (2010). The effect of alternative goals on earnings management studies: An earnings benchmark examination. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 29, pp. 459-480.
    Hayn, C. (1995). The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, pp. 125-153.
    Healy, P. (1985). The impact of bonus schemes on the selection of accounting principles. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, pp. 85-107.
    Healy, P. M., and J. M. Wahlen. (1999). A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons, 13(4), pp. 365-383.
    Healy, P., and K. Palepu. (1990). Effectiveness of accounting-based dividend covenants. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12, pp. 97-123.
    Herrmann, T., T. Inoue, and W. B. Thomas. (2003). The sale of assets to manage earnings in Japan. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(1), pp. 89-108.
    Hoitash, U., R. Hoitash, and J. C. Bedard. (2009). Corporate governance and internal control over financial reporting: A comparison of regulatory regimes. The Accounting Review, 84(3), pp. 839-867.
    Holthausen, R., D. Larcker, and R. Sloan. (1995). Annual bonus schemes and the manipulation of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19, pp. 29-74.
    Jacobs, M. (1991). Short-term America: The causes and cures of our business myopia. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press.
    Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), pp. 831-80.
    Jiang, W., P. Lee, and A. Anandarajan. (2008). The association between corporate governance and earnings quality: Further evidence using the GOV-Score. Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting, 24, pp. 191-201.
    Jiraporn, P., G. A. Miller, S. S. Yoon, and Y. S. Kim. (2008). Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective. International Review of Financial Analysis, 17, pp. 622-634.
    Jones, J. J. (1991). Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research, 29, pp. 193-228.
    Kao, L., and A. Chen. (2004). The effects of board characteristics on earnings management. Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(3), pp. 96-107.
    Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), pp. 453-486.
    Kasznik, R., and M. McNichols. (2002). Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analysts forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), pp. 727-759.
    Kedia, S., and T. Philippon. (2009). The economics of fraudulent accounting. Review of Financial Studies, 22(6), pp. 2169-2199.
    Kim, M. S., and W. Kross. (1998). The impact of the 1989 change in bank capital standards on loan loss provisions and loan write-offs. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 25, pp. 69-99.
    Klein, A. (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33, pp. 375-400.
    Kothari, S. P., A. J. Leone, and C. E. Wasley. (2005). Performance matched discretionary accrual measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, pp. 163-197.
    Krishnan, J. (2005). Audit committee quality and internal control: An empirical analysis. The Accounting Review, 80(2), pp. 649-75.
    Larcker, D. F., S. A. Richardson, and İ. Tuna. (2007). Corporate governance, accounting outcomes, and organizational performance. The Accounting Review, 82(4), pp. 963-1008.
    Leggett, D. M., L. M. Parsons, and A. L. Reitenga. (2009). Real earnings management and subsequent operating performance. Working Paper. University of Alabama.
    Lev, B. (2003). Corporate earnings: Fact and fiction. Journal of Economics Perspectives, 17, pp. 27-50.
    Lo, K. (2008). Earnings management and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 45, pp. 350-357.
    Louis, H. (2004). Earnings management and the market performance of acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 74, pp. 121-148.
    Mangena, M., and R. Pike. (2005). The effect of audit committee shareholding, financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures. Accounting and Business Research, 35(4), pp. 327-49.
    Mangena, M., and V. Tauringana. (2008). Audit committees and voluntary external auditor involvement in UK interim reporting. International Journal of Auditing, 12, pp. 45-63.
    Matsumoto, D. (2002). Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. The Accounting Review, 77(3), pp. 483-514.
    Matsuura, S. (2008). On the relation between real earnings management and accounting earnings management: Income smoothing perspective. Journal of International Business Research, 7(3), pp. 63-77.
    McMullen, D. A., and K. Raghundan. (1996). Enhancing audit committee effectiveness. Journal of Accountancy, 182, pp. 79-81.
    McNichols, M. F., and S. R. Stubben. (2008). Does earnings management affect firms' investment decisions? The Accounting Review, 83(6), pp. 1571-1603.
    Monks, R., and N. Minow. (1995). Corporate governance. New York, NY.: Blackwell Publishing.
    Moyer, S. E. (1990). Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13, pp. 123-154.
    Osma, B. G. (2008). Board independence and real earnings management: The case of R&D expenditure. Corporate Governance, 16(2), pp. 116-131.
    Park, Y. (1999). Corporate governance, audit committees, and auditor litigation. Working Paper. University of Illinois at Chicago.
    Peasnell, K. V., P. F. Pope, and S. Young. (2005). Board monitoring and earnings management: Do outside directors influence abnormal accruals? Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 32(7&8), pp. 1311-1346.
    Peng, Y. S., and C. P. Fang. (2010). Acquisition experience, board characteristics, and acquisition behavior. Journal of Business Research, 63, pp. 502-509.
    Perry, S. E., and T. H. Williams. (1994). Earnings management preceding management buyout offers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18, pp. 157-179.
    Perry, S., and R. Grinaker. (1994). Earnings expectations and discretionary research and development spending. Accounting Horizons, 8(4), pp. 43-51.
    Petroni, K. R. (1992). Optimistic reporting in the property casualty insurance industry. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15, pp. 485-508.
    Piot, C., and R. Janin. (2007). External auditors, audit committees and earnings management in France. European Accounting Review, 16(2), pp. 429-454.
    Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., and C. de Fuentes. (2007). The impact of audit committee characteristics on the enhancement of the quality of financial reporting: An empirical study in the Spanish context. Corporate Governance, 15(6), pp. 1394-1412.
    Rangan, S. (1998). Earnings management and the performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, pp. 101-122.
    Rogers, W. (1993). Regression standard errors in clustered samples, in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints 13. TX: Stata Press, 1923.
    Ronen, J., and V. Yaari. (2008). Earnings management: Emerging insights in theory, practice, and research. New York: Springer Series in Accounting Scholarship.
    Roychowdhury, S. (2006). Earnings management through real activities manipulation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(3), pp. 335-370.
    Schipper, K. (1989). Commentary on earnings management. Accounting Horizons, 3, pp. 91-102.
    Shiue, M. J., C. J. Lin, and S. P. Lin. (2004). Corporate governance, earnings management and restatement. International Conference on Economics, Finance and Accounting. Taipei, Taiwan.
    Shiue, M. J., C. J. Lin, and Y. P. Liu. (2009). Board characteristics and overvalued equity: Evidence from Taiwan. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 32, pp. 104-113.
    Shivakumar, L. (2000). Do firms mislead investors by overstating earnings before seasoned equity offerings? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 29, pp. 339-371.
    Shivdasani, A., and D. Yermack. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), pp. 1829-1853.
    Stubben, S. R. (2010). Discretionary revenues as a measure of earnings management. The Accounting Review, 85(2), pp. 695-717.
    Summers, S., and J. Sweeney. (1998). Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis. The Accounting Review, 73(1), pp. 131-146.
    Sun, L., and S. Rath. (2008). Fundamental determinants, opportunistic behavior and signaling mechanism: An integration of earnings management perspectives. International Review of Business Research Papers, 4(4), pp. 406-420.
    Sweeney, A. P. (1994). Debt-covenant violations and managers accounting responses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 17, pp. 281-308.
    Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, amd T. J. Wong. (1998). Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, pp. 63-99.
    Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong. (1998a). Earnings management and the long run market performance of initial public offerings. The Journal of Finance, 6, pp. 1953-1974.
    Teoh, S., I. Welch, and T. Wong. (1998b). Earnings management and the post-issue performance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics, 50, pp. 63-99.
    Thomas, J. K., and H. Zhang. (2002). Inventory changes and future returns. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2-3), pp. 163-87.
    Vafeas, N. (1999). Board meeting frequency and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 53, pp. 113-142.
    Vafeas, N. (2005). Audit committees, boards, and the quality of reported earnings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 22(4), pp. 1093-1122.
    Visvanathan, G. (2008). Corporate governance and real earnings management. Academy of Accounting and Financial Studies Journal, 12(1), pp. 9-22.
    Wang, T. (2006). Real investment and corporate securities fraud. Working Paper. University of Minnesota.
    Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. (1978). Towards a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review, 53, pp. 112-134.
    Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall.
    Weisbach, M. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20(1), pp. 431-60.
    White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 48(4), pp. 817-838.
    Xie, B., W. N. Davidson III, and P. J. DaDalt. (2003). Earnings management and corporate governance: The role of the board and the audit committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, pp. 295-316.
    Xu, R. (2007). Consequences of REM to meet analyst earnings forecasts on subsequent operating performance. Ph.D. Dissertation.
    Yang, J. S., and J. Krishnan. (2005). Audit committees and quarterly earnings management. International Journal of Auditing, 9, pp. 201-219.
    Yang, L., A. Rahman, and M. Bradbury. (2010). The trade-off between real earnings management and accruals management. Working Paper. Massey University.
    Zang, A. Y. (2007). Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation. Working Paper. University of Rochester.
    Zhang, Y., J. Zhou, and N. Zhou. (2007). Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal control weaknesses. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 26(3), pp. 300-27.

    無法下載圖示 校內:2021-12-31公開
    校外:不公開
    電子論文尚未授權公開,紙本請查館藏目錄
    QR CODE