2009年1月1日起，國際財務報告準則 (International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS)第八號公報「Operating Segments」將取代原國際會計準則 (International Accounting Standards, IAS)第十四號公報「Segment Reporting」。該公報規定企業應依管理方式(management approach)來決定營運部門，意即企業需以內部經營決策、資源配置及績效評估作為判斷部門別之基礎，以藉此提高財務報表使用者對於企業經營成效之瞭解程度。然而，此項修訂使得公司的部門報導品質易受主要經營決策者之決議所影響。鑑此，本研究以此公報為根基，並以管理者的「建立帝國誘因」作為主要研究議題，探討IFRS 8新公報施行之後，較具有「建立帝國誘因」的管理階層是否會影響部門報導之品質。本研究採用29個已於2009年起實行IFRS 8的國家作為樣本，發現當管理者「建立帝國誘因」較高時，會傾向減少部門報導之相關資訊使得部門報導品質較低。進一步地，本研究將外部審計的機制納入考量，研究結果顯示隨著外部審計人員查核相關產業的專家經驗以及其對查核所付出的努力程度愈高，愈能夠抑減管理者因「建立帝國誘因」所引起的部門報導品質降低的問題。

The objective of this study is to explore whether managers with incentives of empire building reduce the transparency of segment reporting under the new standard-IFRS 8. IFRS 8, Operating Segments, has replaced the original standard of segment reporting (IAS 14) starting from financial periods commencing on 1 January 2009. Under the new standard, it stipulates that the segment information is to be reported on basis of the management approach. Firms identify segments based on the internal operating decision, resources allocation, and performance in order to improve the users of financial statements to understand firms’ operating performance. However, this revision may lead to segment reporting quality significantly influenced by the chief operating decision maker. In order to investigate the issue underlying the IFRS framework, I use the sample of 29 countries that have followed IFRS 8 over the period 2009, and find that when managers with high incentives to build managerial empire will conceal segment reporting information on purpose which leads to lower segment reporting quality. Furthermore, I argue that good external auditing will improve segment reporting quality to mitigate the agency problem of managerial empire building. My results show that external auditors with industrial experience and high auditing efforts attenuate the agency problem of managerial empire building and consequently increase segment reporting quality.

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