本研究針對2010至2023年台灣銀行業，探討總經理獎金類別（退職金、獎金及特支、現金紅利）與公司治理評鑑結果對銀行風險之影響。
實證結果顯示：退職金與Z‐scores正向、與逾期放款佔總資產比率呈負向顯著，顯示延後給付能有效降低風險；獎金及特支對各項風險皆不顯著，說明現行短期酬勞已包含風險調整機制；現金紅利與Z‐scores呈正向顯著，表示當紅利提高時，銀行資本緩衝能力增強、使破產風險降低。將樣本區分為公股與民營銀行近一步分析後發現，退職金顯著降低民營銀行風險，而現金紅利對民營銀行風險具顯著正向約束作用，對公股銀行則呈現負向效果。公司治理評鑑分數於各模型均不顯著，反映整合性評鑑難以即時反映銀行風險管理差異。建議未來研究可將獎金對不同期限下進行測試以驗證核心結論是否一致，並從評鑑子項目中挑選更具風控導向之指標以改善治理評量之成效。

This study examines the impact of different types of CEO compensation (pension, bonuses and special benefits, cash dividends) and corporate governance evaluation scores on bank risk in Taiwan’s banking sector from 2010 to 2023.
The empirical results show that pension payments are positively associated with Z-scores and negatively associated with the Non-Performing Loans to Total Assets Ratio, indicating that deferred compensation effectively reduces risk. Bonuses and special allowances are not significant for any risk measures, suggesting that current short-term compensation already incorporates risk-adjusted mechanisms. Cash dividends are significantly and positively related to Z-scores, implying that higher dividends enhance a bank's capital buffer and reduce bankruptcy risk.
Further analysis dividing the sample into state-owned and private banks reveals that pension payments significantly reduce risk in private banks. Cash dividends also exhibit a significantly risk-reducing effect in private banks but have a negative effect in state-owned banks. The corporate governance evaluation score is not significant across all models, reflecting that the composite governance index may fail to capture differences in risk management practices in a timely manner.
It is recommended that future research test the effects of bonuses across different time horizons to verify the consistency of these core findings. Additionally, selecting more risk-oriented sub-indicators from the evaluation components may improve the effectiveness of governance assessments.

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