臺灣社會的演進中，政商關係密不可分，至於政商關係與財務報表重編之間是否具有關聯性呢？在具有良好政商關係下，由於牽涉到私人利益或具有政商關係的企業有較低債務成本的壓力，亦或有政治家的保護，具有政商關係的公司，其財務報表的品質可能較低，而提高財務報表重編的可能性。

但企業與政治人物合作，若帶來的是正面影響，例如可幫助企業獲得合作機會或取得較低的融資成本，或是企業與政治人物愛惜自己名聲，而提高企業聲望與知名度且對企業具有監督力量，那麼也有可能提高財務報表的品質，而降低財務報表重編的可能性。從負面影響而言，則有可能是藉著政商關係施壓，而使得財務報表重編的可能性降低。

因此本研究試圖研究政商關係與企業財務報表重編之間的關聯性。從實證結果得出，具有政商關係之企業與財務報表重編間，存在顯著之負向關係，即具政商關係的企業，其企業財務報表重編的可能性較低。這表示政商關係可能為企業營運帶來正向的影響；但也有可能是企業憑藉著政商關係，而降低財務報表重編之可能性。

In the development of Taiwan society, political connection is strong. Does the relationship between political connection and financial restatement exist ? The quality of financial statements of business with good political connection may be low because it may involve the private interests or may have a lower cost of debt and the protection of politicians, and the probability of financial restatement increases in this way.

On the positive side, it may help businesses get access to opportunities for cooperation or lower financing costs if they cooperate with politicians. And it may also decrease the probability of financial restatement by improving the quality of financial statements when business and politicians place emphasis on their reputation, and in this way the popularity of enterprise increases and supervision exists. On the negative side, the probability of financial restatement may decrease under the pressure of political connection.

Therefore, this study seeks to find the relationship between political connection and financial restatement. According to the empirical results, political connection is correlated with financial restatement negatively and significantly. That is, the probability of financial restatement of business with good political connection decreases this way. This means that political connection may make enterprises perform well. However, the probability of financial restatement may decrease under the pressure of political connection.

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