近年來，國內外各大企業弊案的發生對金融市場衝擊很大，因此各國政府與投資市場開始對企業道德與保障投資人之議題逐漸興起，進而「公司治理」的概念也廣受重視。我國證券主管機關為強化董事會職能，自2018年起強制規定全體上市上櫃公司依實收資本額採分階段設置公司治理主管，用以執行與負責公司治理事務，本研究乃探討，董監事自肥的企業是否自願提前推動公司治理主管之設置，以改善公司內部治理機制並達成提升公司治理之目的。實證研究結果發現，肥貓企業自願性提前設置公司治理主管的機率較低，肥貓企業可能基於自利動機及維護董監事溢領酬勞的私利而不自發性的設置公司治理主管，以免董事會運作效率提升後，良好的監督機制會降低日後溢領酬勞的機會。

With cases of malpractice and malfeasance among domestic and international enterprises hitting the financial markets hard in recent years, governments around the world and investment markets are gradually beginning to pay attention to business ethics and investor protection issues, causing "corporate governance" to become a valuable concept. Taiwan's Financial Supervisory Commission requires listed companies to establish corporate governance officers in stages based on actual received capital beginning in 2018. This study investigates whether a fat cat corporation would like to voluntarily appoint a corporate governance officer to improve a company's internal governance system and achieve the goal of corporate governance. The empirical result indicates that it is less likely for a fat cat corporation to build a corporate governance system voluntarily in advance. They are very likely unwilling to set a governance position for self-benefit motivations or to maintain directors' and supervisors' extra premiums if the opportunities for receiving extra premiums decreases under the favorable monitoring mechanism after the directorate's operation becomes more efficient.

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