郵寄回扣(mail-in rebate)為一種受歡迎的差異定價與促銷策略，其可刺激需求，且僅有少部分的消費會兌換回扣。傳統上為製造商提供郵寄回扣，不須透過零售商直接給予消費者折扣。近年來，很多零售商也逐漸開始在自己的商店提供郵寄回扣，如Staples、BestBuy商店，因此本研究為零售商郵寄回扣。本研究發現在現今之市場中，具有替代性商品中有些品牌選擇推出郵寄回扣，而有些品牌則選擇以價格折扣。若郵寄回扣會帶來更多獲利，為何其他品牌不願意更跟進推出郵寄回扣。
而在眾多郵寄回扣文獻中，僅探討單一供應鏈之郵寄回扣議題，並無探討競爭之情形。有鑒於此，本研究探討兩零售商之郵寄回扣與定價決策問題。假設兩零售商皆推出替代性商品下，決定兩零售商最佳零售價格、回扣價格、訂購數量與訂購週期長度。本研究提出了一個雙占模型，利用納許均衡 (Nash equilibrium) 來闡述兩零售商的競爭過程，探討其一零售商是否會選擇跟進另一已推出郵寄回扣促銷之零售商，以及在何種情形零售商會願意跟進推出郵寄回扣或是不願意跟進郵寄回扣。研究結果發現，相對於過往之單一供應鏈文獻，證明並非只要推出郵寄回扣即會獲得更多利潤，且在競爭情況下，僅一零售商推出郵寄回扣下利潤會增加，但另一零售商是否跟進推出郵寄回扣須考量三個因素：兌換回扣百分比、交叉彈性係數和回扣需求參數之關聯。

Mail-in rebate is a popular differential pricing and promotion strategy. It can stimulate demand and only few customers will redeem the rebate. Traditionally, manufactures could directly provide mail-in rebates to customers without retailers. Recently, many retailers start to offer mail-in rebate in their own stores, such as Staples、BestBuy. Therefore, in this research we focus on retail mail-in rebate. We found that substitutable products in some brands will choose to offer mail-in rebate, however, some brands will use price discounts. If mail-in rebate will bring more profits, other brands should like to follow to provide mail-in rebate.
In many mail-in rebate researches, they only study mail-in rebate in Single-Stage Supply Chain, no competing situation. Based on this issue, this research will evaluate the problem of pricing in mail-in rebate between two retailers. Under an assumption that two retailers all sell substitutable products, we will make decisions on the best sale price, rebate price, order quantity and cycle time. This research proposes a duopoly model by using Nash equilibrium to describe the competing progress. We want to know the other retailer will choose to follow the retailer who already offered the mail-in rebate or not, and under what kind of condition will cause different results. Eventually, we can make a conclusion that mail-in rebate could not always make profits. If only one retailer provides mail-in rebate, it can increase profits. However, the key points that the other retailer would like to follow are based on three issues: the percentage of redeem, coefficient of cross elasticity and the parameter of rebate demand.

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