本研究探討高階層管理者與非主管全時員工薪酬比率對公司績效之影響，並進一步探討產品市場競爭及產品市場競爭類型之調節效果。以公開觀測站2019年揭露之非主管全時員工薪酬資訊，並以2018至2019之台灣上市櫃公司做為研究樣本，實證結果發現，高階層管理者與員工的薪酬比率與公司績效呈正相關，支持競賽理論。此外，在激烈的產品市場競爭下，會對薪酬比率與績效間之關聯性產生正向調節效果。最後，當公司處於非價格競爭下，亦會對薪酬比率與績效間之關聯性產生正向調節效果。

The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the senior executive-employee pay ratio and firm performance, as well as to further explore the moderating effect of product market competition and product market competition types. Based on a sample of Taiwan listed and OTC companies during the period from 2018 to 2019 and the information disclosed by the MOPS (Market Observation Post System), the results show that the senior executive-employee pay ratio is positively correlated with firm performance, which supports the Tournament Theory. In addition, we find that under fierce product market competition, there is a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the pay ratio and firm performance. Furthermore, the positive moderating effect also exists when the firm is under non-price competition conditions.

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