在現今全球化的思維下，擁有優秀的人才是公司維持競爭力的一個相當重要因素，藉由建立完善的薪資制度對於公司在徵才及留才方面有著極大的幫助。然而，對於低薪企業，因其給予的薪資較少，若尚不能夠提供員工有利的誘因，則優秀的人才便會逐漸流失，公司的競爭力也將相對的下降，因此，利用獎酬機制來激勵員工及招募人才的議題逐漸受到重視與探討。在台灣，目前共有六種員工獎酬機制─員工分紅、員工分紅入股、員工新股認購權、員工認股選擇權、轉讓庫藏股予員工、以及限制性股票，每種獎酬機制都有其不同的功能及特色。在過去，台灣的企業傾向於使用員工分紅入股的獎酬機制，然而，2008年台灣開啟了員工分紅費用化時代，使用員工分紅入股的方式來徵才與留才的公司便逐漸減少，相對的，使用其他股票基礎之獎酬機制的比例將上升，尤其是利用庫藏股獎酬員工的部分，與其他股票基礎的獎酬機制相比，利用庫藏股買回來獎勵員工的優點除了能夠免除發行新股的繁雜程序及成本，尚能避免公司股本因員工獎酬機制而擴張，進而稀釋原始股東的權益。因此，本研究主要在探討台灣低薪企業是否使用庫藏股來獎勵員工，藉由庫藏股的使用機率及使用程度來進行實證研究，並觀察公司的成長機會是否對庫藏股的使用機率及使用程度有調節的效果。

Today, in a more competitive global environment, talent is an important factor for firms to sustain competitiveness. It is very helpful in attracting and retaining talent by establishing a complete salary system. However, low-paid firms may not provide an effective motivation to attract and retain talent due to the low pay, and thus it may cause the loss of talent, and decrease firm competition. Therefore, using incentives to motivate and attract employees becomes an important issue. In Taiwan, there are six kinds of employee incentives, including cash bonuses, stock bonuses, new share subscription rights, employee stock options (ESOs), treasury stocks, and restricted stocks, each of which has its own functions and features. In the past, firms tended to use stock bonuses to reward employees in Taiwan. However, the era of expensing employee bonuses starts from 2008. Thus the number of bonuses granted to employees is decreased and the number of using other incentives is increased. Compared with other stock-based incentives, using treasury stocks to reward employees has the advantages not only on avoiding the miscellaneous programs and high cost of issuing new stocks, but also preventing the diluted effect on shareholder equity due to granting employee stock-base incentives. Thus, the objective of this paper is to analyze whether low-paid firms use treasury stocks to reward employees, in particular, the probability and the amount of treasury stocks used by low-paid firms to reward their employees are discussed.

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