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研究生: 蔡周足
TSAI, CHOU-CHU
論文名稱: 資訊透明度之研究:家族企業與非家族企業之比較
Information Transparency:A Comparison between Family Firms and Non-Family Firms
指導教授: 楊朝旭
Young, Chaur-Shiuh
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融研究所碩士在職專班
Graduate Institute of Finance (on the job class)
論文出版年: 2013
畢業學年度: 102
語文別: 中文
論文頁數: 59
中文關鍵詞: 資訊透明度家族企業代理問題
外文關鍵詞: Information Transparency, Family Firms, Agency Problems
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  • 家族企業在全球企業皆是相當普遍的企業型態,在各經濟體系中扮演重要的角色,由於企業不斷發生舞弊之行為,使得投資大眾對於企業提供之資訊透明度的要求及需求日漸殷切。國內家族企業經營型態普遍且對國家經濟發展深具影響力,因此家族企業的資訊透明度攸關國家資源的配置。本研究旨在比較家族企業與非家族企業之間,其資訊透明度是否存在差異。
    本研究以證券暨期貨市場發展基金會之資訊揭露評鑑系統所評定結果進行分析,證實家族企業的資訊透明度相較於非家族企業是較低的。此結果顯示,家族企業存在控制與非控制權股東之間嚴重的代理問題,因而導致家族企業的揭露程度較低。

    In the wake of accounting frauds, investors urgently require firms provide more transparent information. Since family firms, a prevalent pattern in global enterprises, play an important role to impact the economic development of a country, information transparency of family firms is associated with the allocation of a country’s resources. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the difference of information transparency exists between family firms and non-family firms.
    Using the evaluation results of the Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System from Taiwan Securities and Futures Institute, we evidence that compared with non-family firms, family firms deliver lower information transparency due to the severe agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.

    摘要 Ⅱ Abstract Ⅲ 誌謝 Ⅳ 目錄 Ⅴ 圖表目錄 Ⅵ 第壹章 緒論 1 第一節 研究背景與動機 1 第二節 研究目的 3 第三節 研究架構 4 第貳章 文獻探討與假說發展 6 第一節 家族企業與非家族企業 6 第二節 資訊評鑑系統 10 第三節 資訊透明度 13 第四節 代理問題與資訊揭露 15 第參章 研究設計 18 第一節 研究模型與變數定義 18 第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 25 第肆章 實證結果與分析 28 第一節 敘述性統計分析 31 第二節 相關性分析 33 第三節 迴歸結果與分析 36 第四節 增額分析 40 第伍章 研究結論與建議 44 第一節 研究結論 44 第二節 研究限制與未來研究建議 46 參考文獻 48 附錄 53

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