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研究生： 蔡駿麒
Chua, Chung-Kee
論文名稱： 應用開放服務導航訊息認證與原子鐘增強衛星導航系統授時關鍵基礎設施的安全與韌性
Develop a Secure and Resilience of GNSS time-based Critical Infrastructure through OSNMA and CSAC
指導教授： 莊智清
Juang, Jyh-Ching
學位類別： 碩士
Master
系所名稱： 電機資訊學院 - 電機工程學系
Department of Electrical Engineering
論文出版年： 2024
畢業學年度： 112
語文別： 英文
論文頁數： 72
中文關鍵詞： 開放服務導航訊息認證 、原子鐘 、欺騙訊號攻擊
外文關鍵詞： Galileo OSNMA, atomic clock, spoofing, meaconing
相關次數： 點閱：33  下載：8 
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    • 隨著科技日新月異的發展，全球衛星導航系統的應用也變得越來越多元。全球衛星導航系統不僅可以用於定位技術，還可以為關鍵基礎設施提供精確的授時服務。由於衛星訊號的資料格式是開放且傳遞到地面的訊號強度非常弱所以利用軟體無線電就可以製造假的衛星訊號，從而欺騙利用衛星導航系統授時的基礎設施。為了確保基礎設施的安全授時，識別衛星訊號的真實性成為當前研究的一個重要課題。
    為了開發一個安全且具有韌性的衛星導航授時服務，本論文利用開放服務導航消息認證和原子鐘提出了一個三層次的檢測系統，以排除錯誤的衛星訊號，進一步提升了衛星導航系統授時的安全性。為增強關鍵基礎設施的整體韌性，本論文還提出了在遭受攻擊後的授時方案。與現有的方法相比，本研究專為關鍵基礎設施的精確授時需求而設計，從基礎設施的視角解決現有的問題。這種檢測方法不僅在實現層面上易於執行，而且每一層的檢測可以補充其他檢測系統的不足，從而實現更加全面的檢測。

    The use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) has become increasingly diverse following the rapid advancement of technology. GNSS can be used not only for positioning but also for precise timing services for critical infrastructure. Due to the open data format of satellite signals and the very weak signal strength transmitted to the ground, software-defined radios (SDRs) can generate fake satellite signals that may spoof infrastructure relying on GNSS. Authenticating satellite signals has become an important research area to ensure secure timing for infrastructure.
    To develop a secure and resilient GNSS-based timing service, this paper proposes a three-level detection system utilizing Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) and atomic clock to detect false satellite signals, thereby enhancing the security of a GNSS-based timing service. Furthermore, this thesis proposes a timing solution to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure in the event of spoofing or meaconing. In comparison with existing methods, this research is specifically designed to address the precise timing needs of critical infrastructure with regards to current issues. By using this detection system, each detection layer can complement the limitations of the others, thus achieving a more comprehensive detection system.

    摘要 II Abstract III 致謝 V Content VI List of Tables VIII List of Figures IX List of Acronyms XI Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Motivation and Objectives 1 1.2 Literature Review 1 1.3 Contributions 5 1.4 Thesis Organization 5 Chapter 2. Technical Background 7 2.1 Attacks on the Time Synchronization of Critical Infrastructure 7 2.1.1 The requirement of critical infrastructure for time synchronization 7 2.1.2 Spoofing and Meaconing 9 2.2 Open Service Navigation Message Authentication 11 2.2.1 Message structure of OSNMA 11 2.2.2 Implementation of OSNMA 14 2.3 Atomic Clock 17 2.3.1 CSAC-SA45S 18 2.4 Summary 20 Chapter 3. Proposed Method 21 3.1 Secure and Resilient GNSS-based Timing System 21 3.2 Three Level Detect Strategy 22 3.2.1 First Level 25 3.2.2 Second Level 27 3.2.3 Third Level 28 3.3 Timing Plan for Critical Infrastructure 29 Chapter 4. Experiment and Analysis 31 4.1 Experiment Setup 31 4.2 Experiment for Each Level 32 4.2.1 First Level 32 4.2.2 Second Level 35 4.2.3 Third Level 36 4.3 Experimental Analysis of GNSS Timing Under Attack and Normal Conditions 42 4.3.1 Experimental Analysis of Replay Signal in Critical Infrastructure 42 4.3.2 Experimental Analysis of Timing Under Attack and Normal Situations 44 4.4 Discussion 47 Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work 49 5.1 Conclusion 49 5.2 Future Research 50 References 52 Appendix A Digital Signature Message 55 Appendix B MAC and key 58

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