本研究探討目標公司所有權結構對併購公告期間短期市場反應的影響，並以目標公司是否具家族企業身分為核心變數，進一步分析交易支付方式（全現金支付）與收購管道（公開收購）對此關係的調節效果。本研究以2014年至2024年間美國上市公司已完成的418筆併購交易為樣本，採用事件研究法衡量併購公告期間的累積異常報酬（CAR），並透過普通最小平方法（OLS）進行實證分析。
研究結果顯示，併購公告可為目標公司股東創造顯著正向的短期財富效果，且家族企業目標公司於公告期間的累積異常報酬顯著高於非家族企業，顯示市場對家族企業可能存在較高的評價溢價。此結果於不同事件窗口下皆具穩健性，支持目標公司家族企業身分與併購公告期間市場反應呈正向關係的研究假說。
在調節效果方面，家族企業身分與全現金支付之交互作用呈現不顯著負向關係，顯示現金支付雖具正向訊號效果，但可能因市場同時考量控制權移轉後的治理延續性與整合風險，使其對目標公司家族企業正向市場評價產生有限的抵減效果。另一方面，家族企業身分與公開收購的交互作用項呈不顯著的正向關係，顯示公開收購並未顯著改變市場對家族企業的評價，因此未支持公開收購會強化目標公司家族企業身分與併購公告期CAR間的正向關係預期。
整體而言，本研究提供近十年美國併購市場的實證證據，補充家族企業作為併購目標時市場評價的研究成果，並進一步檢視支付方式與收購管道在其中所扮演的調節角色，有助於理解市場在併購公告期間如何解讀所有權結構與交易機制所傳遞的資訊。

This study examines the impact of target firms’ ownership structure on short-term market reactions during M&A announcements, focusing on family firm status, and further analyzes the moderating effects of payment method (all-cash payment) and acquisition channel (tender offer). The sample consists of 418 completed M&A transactions involving U.S. listed firms from 2014 to 2024. The event study methodology is employed to measure cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used for empirical analysis.
The results show that M&A announcements generate significantly positive short-term wealth effects for target shareholders. Family firms exhibit significantly higher CAR than non-family firms, indicating a valuation premium from the market. This finding is robust across different event windows and supports the positive relationship between family firm status and market reactions during M&A announcements.
Regarding moderating effects, the interaction between family firm status and all-cash payment is negative but statistically insignificant, suggesting that concerns over governance continuity and post-acquisition integration partially offset the positive signal of cash payment. The interaction between family firm status and tender offers is positive but insignificant, indicating that tender offers do not significantly alter market reactions toward family firms and do not strengthen their positive CAR effect.
Overall, this study provides recent evidence from the U.S. M&A market, complements the literature on family firms as acquisition targets, and enhances the understanding of how investors interpret ownership structure and transaction mechanisms during M&A announcements.

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