本研究目的為探討政商關係、審計委員會、部門別報導品質間之關聯。國際財務報告準則 (International Financial Reporting Standards, IFRS) 第八號公報「Operating Segments」規定企業應依管理法(management approach)來辨認及揭露營運部門資訊，意即企業需以內部經營決策、資源配置及績效評估作為判斷部門別之基礎，以提高財務報表使用者對於企業經營成效之瞭解。台灣財務會計準則公報第四十一號「營運部門資訊之揭露」為依照IFRS 8修訂，對財務報表開始日在2011年1月1日（含）以後之財務報表開始適用。本研究以部門別報導品質作為根基，並且以政商關係和審計委員會做為主要研究的議題，探討政商關係是否影響部門別報導之品質，以及審計委員會之設立對政商關係與部門別報導品質間之關聯是否有正向的調節效果。本研究以2011年台灣上市公司為樣本，發現具有政商關係之公司會傾向於揭露較少的部門別資訊，使其部門別報導品質較低。並且發現審計委員會具有較多財務專長成員可以改善部門別報導品質，並對政商關係與部門別報導品質間之負向關聯具有正向的調節效果。

The objective of this study is to explore whether political connections have effects on segment reporting quality and whether establishment of audit committee has moderating effects on the relationship between political connections and segment reporting quality. IFRS 8, Operating Segments, identifies and discloses segment information by management approach, firms are expected to mitigate the difference between the disclosed financial reporting and the internal management report, and thus the financial reporting users may obtain more detailed information from the management and thus this so doing improves the information quality of financial reports. Taiwan’s Financial Accounting Standard No.41, The Disclosure of Segment Reporting, which follows IFRS 8 and has became effective since 2011. Using the sample of Taiwan in 2011, I find that firms with political connections have lower segment reporting quality, indicating that politically connected firms intend to conceal segment reporting information. Moreover, I find that audit committees with more financial experts are capable of improving segment reporting quality, and also mitigate the negative effects of political connections on segment reporting quality.

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