本研究探討家族企業相對於非家族企業是否能夠降低員工與高管薪酬的
差距。此外，本研究亦探討家族企業控制權與現金流量權偏離的情況，是否也會使其在薪酬政策上傾向更照顧員工。過去已有研究顯示，家族企業由於有資產繼承的動機，在投資決策上具有較長遠的眼光。然而在股權偏離的情況下，家族企業也可能會追求家族自身的私人利益而傷害公司價值。本研究則認為在縮小員工與高管薪酬差距時，家族企業能同時滿足自身財務及繼續經營的動機，並且透過股權偏離來達成自身利益的追求。
本論文以 2018 年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，實證結果發現：家族企業相對於非家族企業擁有較低的經理人與員工薪酬比率。家族企業的超額控制權與經理人與員工薪酬比率亦呈現負向相關，並且當股權偏離程度越高，越能有效消除員工與高管薪酬的差距。超額控制權作為家族企業達成家族利益的一種手段，可以幫助降低經理人與員工薪酬比率。不論是削減超額的高管薪酬或是增加員工薪酬，由於家族企業的長久經營利益能夠經由其所擁有的超額控制權而強化，因此能夠有效降低經理人與員工薪酬比率。

This study examines whether family firms have more incentives on pay equality than non-family firms. Furthermore, I exploit the control-ownership deviation to find its impacts on family firms’ better treatment of their employees. Prior literature has argued that family firms with a bequest motives tend to conduct long-horizons decisions, while the firms with a control-ownership deviation tend to value extraction. Other prior studies show that family firms’ desire to continue and pass on their business would limit their entrenchment incentives. In terms of pay equity, family firms reach a consensus with their financial incentives and personal benefits.
Based on Taiwan’s publicly traded companies in 2018, I conclude that family firms could mitigate the compensation disparity of executives and employee. Furthermore, there is negative effect of excess control on pay ratios, and the effects are more evident under higher levels of control-ownership separation in family firms. These findings help explain why family firms exhibit equality in executives-employee compensation dispersion. Because control-ownership wedges of an entrenched family firm are negatively related to employee compensation dispersion, I interpret the lower workers’ pay ratios as evidence of agency problems from the separation of ownership and control in family business. If it were favorable for family owners with more control to either pay higher wages or reduce excessive executives’ pay, they would reduce even more pay disparities when they have more bequest incentives to do so through longer investment horizons in their firms.

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