本研究主要以兩個模型為架構探討在供應鏈中供應商與零售商之競爭與合作關係。其中模型一是以Stackelberg賽局為主之EOQ模型，說明供應鏈中包括單一供應商及單一零售商，兩者之間供應商處於壟斷的地位，不但掌握了零售商的成本訊息，同時也具有決定交期的權利。在此情況下，最佳的訂貨交期及訂單循環時間是值得研究及探討的。透過求解這種情況下的最佳交期(前置時間)來分析買賣雙方的利益及損失，並導出控制前置時間對整體供應鏈的影響。模型二則是以委託代理模型探討兩階段供應鏈的委託與代理的合作契約關係，並將此關係分為以下三個部份探討：(1)供應商與零售商可在合作之初先簽定合約，以促進供應鏈之收益，並找出合作合約之最佳邊際係數。(2)供應商對零售商的激勵型式，在此將激勵型式簡略分為兩種型式，分別以貨幣報酬激勵及精神報酬激勵型式來激勵零售商，且分析不同的激勵所帶來的成效。(3)綜合前述兩個模型延進一步伸探討多個供應商與單一製造商的合作最佳激勵機制以更符合供應鏈之實際運作，透過此部分本研究將探討供應商合作與不合作及以單一激勵及多重激勵機制對供應鏈的成員及整體的效益分析。由上述模型歸納出以下結論：在EOQ模型中，供應商若能在前置時間上讓步，可促進供應鏈的效率，進而達到供應商與零售商的雙贏，而在委託代理模型中，共有三點結論。(1) n 個供應商共同對零售商設計報酬機制，對零售商的激勵作用將大於獨立對零售商設計報酬的激勵，且隨著供應商的家數增多，兩者之間的激勵作用差距將更形加大。(2) 就單重激勵與多重激勵比較來看，多重激勵無論是對供應商或是零售商及整體供應鏈而言，產生的效益都大於單重激勵，而且零售商獲得的效益將多於供應商。(3) 在供應鏈中，無論是單重激勵或是多重激勵機制，供應商獨立(不合作)決策較供應商有利。因此，獨立決策能大幅提高供應商的收益，致於對零售商而言，收益則沒有影響。

　In this dissertation, we discussed a competitive and cooperative model on the game theory approach in Manufacture-retailer supply chain. There are two main models in the construction of the study. Model 1 is a distribution channel system contains one supplier (manufacturer) and a single retailer, and the supplier in the channel holds monopolistic status, in which he has both cost information about the retailer and the decision-making right of the lead-time. Under the circumstances, the optimal lead-time and the order cycle time of the supplier and the retailer are investigated, and an approximate solution for them is derived. The analysis is made by numerical data that are likely to cause the profits and losses of the supplier and the retailer by controlling the lead time. In model 2, a principal-agent relationship can be established up for a supply chain, in which the supplier acts as the principal while the manufacturer acts as the agent. This study uses a principal-agent model to explore the relationships between multiple suppliers and a single manufacturer. A mechanism of incentives is introduced in the model, which encourages the manufacturer to make more efforts to reach the expectations of suppliers; thus, profits are made in the supply chain. Comparisons and analyses have been made on both united- and separate-designed compensation mechanisms of multiple suppliers (principals) to a single manufacturer (agent) and on both multi- and single-incentive policies in this study. Fruitful results were found as follows: In Model 1, the results show that if the supplier makes some advisable concessions, then both sides can win. And in Model 2, we have: (1) As an incentive to the manufacturer, the effect of the united supplier model is better than that of the separate one. When the number of the suppliers’ increases, the gap between the effects of these two different models will become larger. (2) The multi-incentive mechanism is more favorable than the single incentive mechanism, and the manufacturer will get more benefits than the supplier. (3) In the supply chain, whether a single or multi-incentive mechanism is in operation, the separate policy is more favorable to the suppliers than the united policy. In addition, the former can greatly enhance the benefits of the suppliers, but the income of the manufacturer does not change.

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