有鑑於近年來機構投資人於集中交易市場進行交易的比例逐年攀升，不論是對於市場或被投資企業皆有重大影響，因此，機構投資人的「盡職治理」也就變得十分重要。我國證券交易所於2016年發布機構投資人「盡職治理守則」，用以規範機構投資人之盡職治理及執行，以期機構投資人能更加落實盡職治理，達成永續經營之目標。
本研究旨在探討我國「盡職治理守則」與公司進行盈餘管理行為間之關聯。實證結果顯示，當身為主要股東之機構投資人在簽署盡職治理守則後，公司之正向裁決性應計數顯著下降，顯示在主要股東簽署盡職治理守則後，公司之管理階層會減少進行向上盈餘管理之行為，使公司之盈餘品質有所提升。另外，本研究以公司治理評鑑作為調節變數，並發現，若企業於公司治理評鑑結果中排名越佳，會因為其公司治理機制完善使企業本身即擁有較高之盈餘品質，進而使主要股東簽署盡職治理守則後對於公司盈餘品質之改善效果較不顯著。此外，在額外分析中也發現，當公司規模相對較大，或財務報表係由四大會計師事務所查核，也能夠得到與前述結果一致之結論。

In recent years, the proportion of institutional investors trading in Taiwan’s capital market has increased year by year, which has a significant impact on both the market and the investee enterprises. Therefore, the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) issued the “Taiwan Stewardship Principles (TSP)” in 2016. The TSP is to regulate the stewardship of institutional investors so that institutional investors can better improve the corporate governance of investee companies and achieve the goal of sustainable development.
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between the TSP and earnings management. Empirical results show that when the institutional investors who are the major shareholders sign the TSP, the positive discretionary accruals of investee companies decrease significantly. In other words, after signing the TSP, the company’s management will reduce the degree of upward earnings management and improve the company’s earnings quality. Furthermore, my finding also shows that the difference in corporate governance evaluation will affect the relationship between the TSP and earnings management. In the additional analyses, I also find that when the company is relatively large or the financial statements are audited by Big 4 accounting firms, conclusions consistent with the above results can be obtained.

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