摘要
供應鏈的資訊分享在近年來被大量的提倡，藉由零售商將資訊分享給上游的供應商，能夠提升供應鏈的總體效益，但是當零售商的資訊是有關於本身所面對的需求價量關係不確定時，零售商分享其資訊反而會使零售商本身的期望利潤降低，使得零售商並沒有動機去分享資訊。但是假設供應鏈中有兩個供應商的話，並且供應商必須經由競爭行為來取的零售商訂單的話，此時零售商的資訊是否可以幫零售商本身獲得利益，如果可以，那麼此利益又會因為哪些其他因素而改變呢?
因此本研究擬假設在一個二對一的供應鏈系統中，供應商必須藉用拍賣的方式競爭，來取得零售商向其訂購的權利，如同付給零售商上架費的觀念，來觀察零售商是否分享本身所觀察到的對價量關係不確定的資訊，而其資訊準確度的不同，又會如何影響接受資訊的供應商其上架費的變化。進而去定義零售商本身所擁有的資訊的價值為何?並觀察成本不同的供應商的情況下，對其上架費會有如何的變化，進而也會影響到零售商本身資訊的價值是否會因供應商種類不同而有所改變。
接著將二對一的供應鏈擴大為二對多的供應鏈，並且零售商本身皆面對相同的需求，也就是每個零售商皆有能力提供對價量關係不確定的資訊時，供應商的上架費會有怎麼樣的改變，進而可以了解到零售商本身握有的資訊的價值，能否因為有能力提供資訊的零售商人數變多而有所變化。
本研究可能得到的結果包括:在二個供應商的情況下，零售商本身資訊的準確度對本身藉由資訊所能得到的利益的影響。供應商種類不同對零售商本身所能得到利益之影響。供應鏈中零售商分享資訊次序先後對零售商本身利益之影響。
關鍵字:供應鏈，需求不確定之資訊分享，拍賣

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