本文以台灣上市公司為樣本，探討公司績效、董事會組成與所有權結構對總經理替換的影響，以Logit迴歸進行實證，並用負二項分配模型做為輔助，我們發現相對會計績效與經理人替換呈現顯著負相關，相對會計績效欠佳的公司經理人替換機率較高。董事會規模與經理人替換率呈現正相關；而政府在2007年強制設置獨立董事席次，對經理人的監督並未呈現出顯著性的效果；家族企業與經理人替換率為負相關，意即家族企業裡的經理人是較難替換的。投資機構持股與大股東持股對經理人替換率並未呈現出顯著性的效果。
由於台灣上市公司具有家族企業特性，本文也針對家族企業樣本進行實證分析，可以發現，公司績效只在發生金融風暴後期對經理人替換率有顯著影響。而家族企業中經理人所有權高低與其替換率呈現顯著性的負相關，當經理人持有愈高的所有權時，在公司裡的地位是較難以動搖的。

This study examines the link between CEO turnover and firm performance, board composition, and ownership structure at publicly listed companies in Taiwan. We adopt logit regression model and negative binominal distribution model to implement empirical analysis. Empirical results indicate a significant negative relationship between relative accounting performance and CEO turnover. The turnover rate in firms with poor accounting performance is higher than that with better performance. The relation between board size and CEO turnover rate is positive. The monitoring mechanism did not show a significant effect after the mandatory independent director regulation by government since 2007. In addition, CEO turnover rate is lower within family firm. Institutional investor shareholding and blockholder shareholding did not show a significant effect to CEO turnover rate.
Since plenty of corporations in Taiwan have family features, we add this character to our empirical analysis. The results shows that firm performance would affect CEO turnover during the post-financial period. In family firms, the relationship between managers’ shareholdings and CEO turnover rate is significantly negative. Furthermore, it is more difficult to replace family managers if their shareholdings are higher.

中文部份
王育偉 (2004)，「公司治理機制與經理人異動關係之研究」，朝陽科技大學企業管理學系碩士論文。

李馨蘋、劉清明 (2007)，「從公司治理與企業績效之觀點看高階主管異動之因素」，真理財經學報， 十六期， 頁1-22。

李佳玲、葉穎蓉、何晉滄 (2005)，「績效、公司治理與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究」，中山管理評論，第十三卷第一期，頁75-138。

林穎芬、祝道松、洪晨桓 (2006)，「經濟附加價值與總經理更替之探討」，當代會計， 第七卷第一期， 頁103-134。

林穎芬、洪晨桓、陳羽甄 (2011)，「家族與非家族企業之總經理替換與相對績效的關聯-以台灣上市公司為例」，管理評論， 第三十卷第三期， 頁25-47。

林萱 (2011)，「家族企業、資訊不對稱與盈餘管理之關聯性」，國立成功大學會計學研究所碩士論文。

洪榮華、陳香如、王玉珍 (2005)，「公司內部治理機制與公司績效之關係-股權結構與董事會特性的觀點」，輔仁管理評論， 第十二卷第三期， 頁23-40。

陳美華、洪世炳 (2005)，「公司治理、股權結構與公司績效關係之實證研究」， 企業管理學報， 第六十五期，頁129-153。

郭逸真 (2006)，「台灣家族與非家族企業之公司治理：以總經理異動為例」，國立中央大學企業管理研究所博士論文。

楊朝旭、蔡柳卿 (2003)，「總經理更換與相對績效評估」，人力資源管理學報， 第三卷第一期，頁63-80。

鄧榮心 (2010)，「公司治理、股權結構與公司價值的關係-台灣市場受全球金融風暴影響之探討」，國立中正大學財務金融研究所。

歐陽豪、莊雙喜 (2007)，「公司治理、相對績效與高階管理者離職關係之實證研究」，亞太經濟管理評論， 第十一卷第一期， 頁53-86。

鄭伶如 (2008)，「公司治理、資本結構與公司價值關係之研究」， personnel.sju.edu.tw 。

蔡柳卿 (2006)，「相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響」，管理評論，第二十五卷第一期，頁69-94。

遲銘俊 (2004)，「董事會組成與股權結構對高階主管更迭、公司價值與績效之關聯性¬-以台灣上市(櫃)金融業及電子業為例」，國立成功大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。

鐘喜梅、劉韻僖、葉匡時 (2003)，「我國上市公司家族控制力與董事會運作關係之探討」，中山管理評論，頁2-23。
英文部分
Anderson, R. C. and D. M. Reeb, (2003), “Founding-Family Ownership, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Leverage,” Journal of Law and Economics, 46(2), pp653-680.

Brickley, J. A., J. L. Coles, and G. Jarrell, (1997), “Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board,”Journal of Corporate Finance, 3, pp189-220.

Brunello, G., C. Graziano, and B. M. Parigi, (2003), “CEO Turnover in Insider-Dominated Boards: The Italian Cause,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(6), pp1027-1051.

Bushee, B. (1998), “The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior,” The Accounting Review, 73(3), pp303-330.

Bushman, R., Z. Dai, and X. Wang, (2009), “Risk and CEO Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), pp381-398.

Byrd, J., R. Parrino, and G. Pritsch, (1998), “Stockholder-Manager and Firm Value,” Financial Analysts Journal, 54(3), pp14-30.

Chaganti, R. S., V. Mahajan, and S. Sharma, (1985), “Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in the Retailing Industry,” Journal of Management Studies, 22(4), pp400-417.

Clayton, M. J., J. C. Hartzell, and J. V. Rosenberg, (2000), “The Impact of CEO Turnover on Equity Volatility,” NYU Working Paper.

Conyon, M. J. (1998), “Directors’ Pay and Turnover: An Application to A Sample of Large UK Firms,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(4), pp485-507.

Coughlan, A. T. and R. M. Schmdit, (1985), “Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(3), pp43-65.

Dang, B. N. (2011), “Ownership Structure and Board Characteristics as Determinants of CEO Turnover in French-Listed Companies,” Finance, 32, pp53-89.

Dalton , D. R. and I. F. Kesner, (1987), “Composition and CEO Duality in Boards of Directors：An international perspective,” Journal of International Business Studies, 18(3), pp33-42.

Defond, M. L. and C. W. Park, (1999), “The Effect of Competition on CEO Turnover,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 27(1), pp35-56.

Denis, D. J. and D. K. Denis, (1995), “Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals,” The Journal of Finance, 50(4), pp1029-1057.

Denis, D. J., D. K. Denis, and A, Sarin, (1997), “Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 45(2), pp193-221.

Donaldson, L. and J. H. Davis, (1991), “Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns,” Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), pp49-64.

Dyer, W. G. (2006), “Examining the “Family Effect” on Firm Performance,” Family Business Review, 19(4), pp253-273.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989), “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review, 14(1), pp57-74.

Erkens, D. H., M. Hung, and P. Matos, (2009), “Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institution Worldwide,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(2), pp389-411.

Fama, E. F. (1980), “Agency Problems and The Theory of The Firm,” Journal of Political, 88(2), pp288-307.

Fama, E, F. and M. C. Jensen, (1983), “Separation of Ownership and Control,” Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), pp301-325.

Frank, J., C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog, (2001), “Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performaning Companies?,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(3-4), pp209-248.

Gamson, W, A. and N. A. Scotch, (1964), “Scapegoating in Baseball,” American Journal of Sociology, 70(1), pp69-72.

Gibbons, R. and K. J. Murphy, (1990), “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers,” NBER Working Paper, No.w2944.

Gilson, S. C. (1989), “Management Turnover and Financial Distress,” Journal of Financial Economics, 25(2), pp241-262.

Grusky, O. (1963), “Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness,” American Journal of Sociology, 69(1), pp21-31.

Goyal, V. K. and C. W. Park, (2002), “Borad Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover,” Journal of Corporate Finance, 8(1), pp49-66.

Guest, R. H. (1962), “Managerial Succession in Complex Organizations,” American Journal of Sociology, 68(1), pp47-56.

Hermalin, B. E. and M. S. Weisbach, (1988), “The Determinants of Board Composition,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4), pp589-606.

Jensen, M. C.(1993), “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems,” Journal of Finance, 48(3), pp831-880.

Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, (1976), “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost, and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp305-360.

Jensen, M. C. and R. S. Ruback, (1983), “The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,” Journal of Finance Economics, 11(1-4), pp5-50.

Jensen, M. C. and J. B. Warner, (1988), “The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp3-24.

Jenter, D. and K. Lewellen, (2010), “Performance-Induced CEO Turnover,” Working Paper, Stanford Univ.

Kaplan, S. N. and B. A. Minton, (1994), “Appointment of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers,” Journal of Finance Economics, 36(2), pp225-258.

Kashyap, A., R. Rajan, and J. Stein, (2008), “Rethinking Capital Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium at Jackson Hole.

Kensner, I. F. and T. C. Sebora, (1994), “Executive Succession: Past, Present & Future,” Journal of Management, 20(2), pp327-372.

Lausten, M. (2002), “CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence on Danish Firms,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20(3), pp391-414.

Lin, Y. F. and W. C. Liu, (2004), “Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, Compensation, and CEO Turnover in Taiwan,” Asia Pacific Management Review, 9(4), pp603-619.

Lipton, M. and J. W. Lorsh, (1992), “A modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance,” The Business Lawyr, 48(1), pp59-77.

Morck, R. A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny, (1988), “Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control,” American Economic Review, 79(4), pp842-852.

Muravyev, A. (2003), “Turnover of Senior Mangers in Russian Privatised Firm,” Comparative Economic Studies, 45, pp148-172.

Pound, J. (1988), “Proxy Contests and The Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp237-265.

Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny, (1986), “Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), pp461-488.

Tsai, W. H., J. H. Hung., Y. C. Kuo, and L. Kuo, (2006), “CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective,” Family Business Review, 19(1), pp11-28.

Warner, J. B., R. L. Watts, and K. H. Wruck, (1988), “Stock Price and Top Management Changes,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp461-492.

Weisbach, M. S. (1988), “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20, pp431-460.

Wu, T. C., G. Y. Lai, and C. L. Wang, (2011), “The Effect of Director and Family Shareholdings on Firm Performance in Taiwan,” tweb.cjcu.edu.tw.

Yermack, D. (1996), “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with A Small Board of Directors,” Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), pp185-211.

參考網站
證券基金會: http://webline.sfi.org.tw/B/intdb/menu/MainFrame.asp?mitem=B