本研究主要探討高階經理人異動與公司內部會計績效之關聯性。由於造成經理人異動之原因甚多，不同異動原因所傳達之資訊內涵也大不相同，因此本文除了探討企業高階經理人異動與公司績效之關聯外，也進一步將高階經理人異動分為自願、非自願及其他三大類，並比較不同類型的異動與公司會計績效之關聯。
本研究以2011年至2018年台灣上市櫃公司為樣本進行探討，實證結果顯示，公司若發生高階經理人異動，對於當期及後續兩期會計績效呈現負向影響，支持惡性循環理論。區分自願、非自願及其他異動樣本後，發現三種類型的異動對於當期及後續績效皆呈現一致的負向結果；其中，非自願性異動與自願性異動相比，與ROA之負向關係更為強烈。此外，本文亦發現若經理人異動前公司發生虧損，則市場對於三種異動宣告反應均較佳；成長性較高之公司在經歷強迫性異動後，會減輕強迫性異動對ROE所帶來的負向效果。

This study investigate the relationship between the turnover of senior managers and the company’s accounting performance. Because different reasons for managers' changes might have different information content, this study not only investigates whether the managers’ changes is associated with companies’ performance, but also compares the associations between different types of movements and the company's accounting performance by dividing senior managers' changes into three categories: voluntary changes, involuntary changes and other.
This study uses the sample composed of Taiwan listed companies from 2011 to 2018 to investigate the relationship between senior managers’ turnover and firm performance. The empirical results show that a senior manager change is negatively associated with the company’s current and the following two periods’ accounting performance, supporting the vicious circle theory. After dividing senior managers’ change into voluntary, involuntary and other types, the results show that the three different types of managerial change have consistent negative results on current and subsequent performance. Additionally, the results also show that the involuntary changes have a more intense negative relationship with ROA, compared with voluntary changes. This paper also finds that if the company loses money before the manager's change, the market responds better to the three kinds of change announcements; companies with higher growth will reduce the negative effect on ROE after experiencing forced changes.

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