本篇文章探討公司投資決定與管理者裁量權的關係，以 Mauer and Sarkar (2005) 和 Andrikopoulos (2009) 的模型為架構並加入學習曲線設置推導出一個新的模型，希望找出加入學習曲線後，會對經理人的報酬(預留收入、工資、所有權份額)和選擇權價值、投資觸發點、資本結構之間的關係造成什麼影響。我們發現，加入學習效果後，選擇權價值隨著預留收入下降得更快，隨著工資和所有權份額增加得更多，而理想槓桿率隨著預留收入增加得更快，隨著工資和所有權份額下降得更多。當公司有很高的學習速度時，如果經理的預留收入增加，公司可以使用更多的債務融資，如果經理人從投資專案中獲得的工資增加或持股增加，公司的舉債規模下降，此外，代理成本也會下降。

This article discusses the relationship between investment decision and managers’discretion, basing on the structure of Mauer and Sarkar (2005) and Andrikopoulos (2009) and include the learning curve setting into the model to derive a model to find out what learning curve brings to the relationship between manager’s compensation (reservation income, salary, ownership shares) and option value, investment trigger, and capital structure. When adding the learning effect, the option value decreases faster in reservation income and increases more in salary and ownership shares, optimal leverage ratio increases faster in reservation income and optimal leverage ratio decreases more in salary and ownership shares. When the company has higher learning speed, the company can finance with more debt if the manager’s reservation income increases and finance with less debt if the manager’s salary from the investment project or the manager’s ownership shares increase, moreover, the agency costs also decline.

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