本研究旨在探討執行長大幅度減薪對於審計公費之影響，執行長遭受大幅度減薪，會增加執行長從事盈餘管理行為的動機，使得審計人員暴露於較高的風險之中，為了將風險降低至可接受水準，審計人員須投入更多的資源，導致審計公費大幅提高。本研究利用2000年至2014年(截至會計年度終了日2014年12月31日)美國S&P 1500家公司(剔除金融產業及公用事業)進行檢測。研究結果發現，在控制當期盈餘管理程度後，執行長減薪與審計公費之間呈高度正相關，表示審計人員認為執行長減薪會增加審計風險，並透過調整審計定價以因應風險。本研究亦發現，良好的公司治理可以抑制執行長減薪與審計公費之間的正向關聯。此外，本研究進行四個額外測試，並發現：(1)執行長遭受減薪後，審計人員會延長發布查核報告的時間。(2)四大事務所的審計定價決策受執行長減薪因素的影響，但非四大事務所並未受其影響，顯示四大事務所相較於非四大事務所的風險控管能力較佳。(3)審計人員評估風險時，會將非權益基礎減薪與權益基礎減薪都納入考量，兩種類型的減薪對審計定價決策都有影響。(4)在控制執行長強迫離職的因素後，執行長減薪與審計公費同樣維持正向關係。

This study examines the relationship between extreme decreases in CEO compensation and the audit fees charges by their audit firms. We propose that CEO pay cuts will increase the incentives to engage in high-risk activities and pose higher risk for auditors. To reduce audit risk to an acceptable level, auditors must exert additional audit effort, further leading to higher audit fees. Using S&P 1500 non-financial and non-utility firms over the period 2000-2014(as of December 31, 2014), we find that CEO pay cuts are positively related to audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive heightened audit risk associated with CEO pay cuts. We also find that the positive association between CEO pay cuts and audit fees is less pronounced in the case of firms with stronger corporate governance. Further analyses provide evidence that (1) CEO pay cuts led to longer ARL; (2) only Big 4 audit firms respond to CEO pay cuts in audit pricing decisions; (3) auditors take into account both equity-based and non-equity-based incentives in risk assessment and pricing decision; (4) after controlling for CEO forced turnover, CEO pay cuts are also positively related to audit fees.

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