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研究生: 詹哲旻
Chan, Che-Min
論文名稱: 公司治理3.0-擴大設置獨立董事對於公司績效之影響
Corporate Governance 3.0 – The Effect of Expanding Appointment of Independent Directors on Firm Performance
指導教授: 林軒竹
Lin, Hsuan-Chu
學位類別: 碩士
Master
系所名稱: 管理學院 - 財務金融研究所
Graduate Institute of Finance
論文出版年: 2023
畢業學年度: 111
語文別: 英文
論文頁數: 21
中文關鍵詞: 獨立董事公司治理公司績效家族企業
外文關鍵詞: Independent directors, Corporate governance, Firm performance, Family enterprises
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  • 本研究旨在探討獨立董事任用比例對於公司績效的影響,本文以2017年至2021年間台灣的上市櫃公司排除金融業後的樣本資料為研究對象。應變數的公司績效部分採用資產報酬率(ROA)、股東權益報酬率(ROE)兩項會計指標以及Tobin’s Q作為代理變數,主要變數「董事會獨立性」則採用兩種衡量方式,其一為單純的獨立董事占全體董事比例,其二為虛擬變數,以獨立董事比例超過1/3為基準,超過的樣本公司另為1,反之則為0。另外,考量到過往文獻指出家族企業對於公司治理成效的影響,本研究也納入家族企業的因素做為考量。本文以OLS迴歸進行實證研究,結果發現:(1)獨立董事佔比越高,公司的ROA、ROE以及Tobin’s Q會越低。(2)獨立董事比例超過1/3的公司,其ROA、ROE以及Tobin’s Q會低於任用比例未超過1/3的公司。(3)前述董事會獨立性與公司績效的負向關係在家族企業中會更為嚴重。綜上所述,本研究對於主管機關未來對於提高獨立董事席次的要求持保留態度,獨立董事的席次越多對於公司治理成效反而會造成反效果。

    This study aims to explore the impact of the proportion of appointment of independent directors on firm performance. The target of the study is TWSE-listed and TPEx-listed companies excluding the financial industry for the period between 2017 to 2021. Return on assets (ROA), return on shareholders' equity (ROE), and Tobin's Q are used as proxy variables for firm performance. The main variable, board independence, is measured in two ways: (1) Total seats of independent directors accounting for the board. (2) Dummy variable equaling one if an observation has a ‘high-independence board,’ which is defined as the independent ratio being higher than one-third. Considering the influence of family enterprises on the effectiveness of corporate governance pointed out in the previous literature, this study also examines the family firm moderating effect. In this paper, OLS regression is used for empirical research. The results show that: (1) The higher the proportion of independent directors, the lower the ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q of the company will be. (2) The performance of companies with a proportion of independent directors higher than one-third would be worse than those below one-third. (3) The aforementioned negative relationship between board independence and firm performance is more severe in family enterprises to some degree. To sum up, this study has reservations about the government’s requirements for increasing the number of seats of independent directors in the future. The increase in independent directors will have negative effects on firm performance.

    摘要 I ABSTRACT II 誌謝 III TABLE OF CONTENTS IV TABLE OF LIST V 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 4 2.1 DEBATES ON INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 4 2.2 THE DIFFERENT EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS CAUSED BY FAMILY BUSINESS 6 3. METHODOLOGY 8 3.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 8 3.2 RESEARCH MODEL 8 3.2.1 Dependent Variables 9 3.2.2 Independent Variables 10 3.2.3 Control Variables 11 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 12 4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 12 4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 14 5. CONCLUSION 17 REFERENCES 19

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