本研究探討通才型CEO是否影響公司非GAAP盈餘的揭露決策，關注其揭露傾向、激進程度與資訊品質。通才型CEO具備跨產業的職涯經驗與能力，過去文獻指出通才型CEO具有較高的風險偏好與勞動市場流動性，可能傾向採取較積極的財務揭露策略。本研究以美國E上市公司為樣本，依Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2013)的方法衡量CEO的通才特質。實證結果顯示，通才型CEO較傾向揭露非GAAP盈餘，揭露的盈餘品質較低，但其與盈餘激進程度無顯著關聯。進一步橫斷面分析結果顯示，在高流動機會地區與高研發公司中，通才型CEO更傾向揭露非 GAAP 盈餘，且盈餘品質較低，可能反映其為達成短期績效、維持聲譽或掩蓋負面財務績效而進行盈餘調整行為。本研究對文獻與實務皆具貢獻；學術上，補足通才型CEO對財務揭露政策影響的研究空白，並拓展非GAAP盈餘決定因素的探討；實務上，提供董事會、分析師與投資人評估CEO特質與財務資訊品質之參考依據。

This study examines whether generalist CEOs—those with diverse, cross-industry experiences—affect firms’ non-GAAP earnings disclosure decisions. Using U.S. public firms and following Custódio et al. (2013) to measure generalist traits, we analyze their impact on disclosure propensity, aggressiveness, and earnings quality. Results show that generalist CEOs are more likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings and tend to provide lower-quality earnings information, though no significant link is found with disclosure aggressiveness. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that in regions with high labor mobility opportunities and firms with intensive R&D, generalist CEOs are more prone to disclose non-GAAP earnings of lower quality. These findings suggest motivations such as meeting short-term performance goals, maintaining reputations, or obscuring poor financial performance. The study contributes to literature by highlighting how CEO traits influence disclosure practices and extends the understanding of non-GAAP reporting determinants. Practically, it offers insights for boards, analysts, and investors evaluating the implications of CEO characteristics for financial reporting quality.

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