本研究主要為探討美國證券管理委員會(SEC)強制上市公司財報使用XBRL格式申報後，是否能降低董事領取超額薪酬情形發生。當公司皆以XBRL格式申報其財務報導後，財報使用者將更易讀取、比較各家公司所揭露之資訊，市場監督力量因此提升，公司治理情形可能因而改變，從而減少代理問題。美國企業分別於2009年、2010年、2011年開始使用XBRL格式申報其財務報表，因此本研究以美國為研究對象，以各公司導入XBRL之前三年、後三年為樣本期間，使用OLS估計方法，探討財報強制採用XBRL格式對董事超額薪酬之影響。實證結果顯示，財報強制使用XBRL格式申報後，將降低董事獲取正超額薪酬情形，而在董事領取負超額薪酬部分則無差異。

This study mainly examines whether the mandatory adoption of XBRL in the U.S. can reduce the payment of excess compensation to directors. We develop a model to predict normal director compensation, then we calculate whether directors of corporate boards are over- or under-compensated. From 2009 to 2011, the U.S. SEC mandated public companies to adopt the XBRL format on financial reports in three phases. We take advantage of this policy and use the OLS regression method to examine the impact of XBRL on director compensation. The result shows that director overcompensation is improved after XBRL adoption, while there is no difference among directors who are undercompensated.

一、中文部分
諶家蘭(2015)，「美國實施XBRL政策之概況」，會計研究月刊，第350期，頁44-51。
二、英文部分
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