本文旨在探討社會網絡關係對避稅效果之影響。社會網絡理論認為，社會網絡是專業知識與實務經驗的分享平台。而本文以此為研究基礎，認為創業投資機構可於資本市場中擔任知識仲介者之角色，使其被投資公司可透過與創投機構所建立之投資關係，與另一被投資公司交換彼此避稅策略及經驗，進而運用並達到避稅效果之目的。實證研究結果發現，透過創投機構的知識分享網絡，與低稅率公司之連結愈多，可達到愈低的現金有效稅率，亦即避稅效果愈顯著。本文的研究結果顯示，網絡關係會影響避稅活動，並暗示創業投資機構有別於傳統扮演金融中介機構的觀點，亦具有知識仲介的功能。

This study examines whether network ties help explain which firms are low-tax. Based on social network theory, I assume that the social networks act as a means for information transmission; therefore, skill about tax avoidance strategies is transmitted across firms via their social network ties. Using venture capitalist interlocks to proxy for firm’s network connections, I find that the level of firm’s tax avoidance is associated with its connections to other low-tax firms. My result suggests that, in addition to board interlock, venture capitalist plays an important role in its investee’s early-stage tax avoidance.

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