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研究生：	李揚 Li, Yang
論文名稱：	公司契約關係理論──以公司章程或辦事細則免除董事受任人義務之檢視 The Nexus-of-Contracts Approach to Corporations: Reviewing the Liability Exculpation of Director’s Fiduciary Duty by the Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws
指導教授：	陳俊仁 Chen, Chun-Jen
學位類別：	碩士 Master
系所名稱：	社會科學院 - 法律學系 Department of Law
論文出版年：	2016
畢業學年度：	104
語文別：	英文
論文頁數：	136
中文關鍵詞：	公司契約理論、董事責任、注意義務、免責條款、訴訟成本轉嫁條款
外文關鍵詞：	Nexus-of-contracts Theory, Director’s Liability, Duty of Care, Exculpatory Provision, Fee-shifting Provision
相關次數：	點閱：126 下載：8
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作為一個極具爭議性的論題，公司的性質長久以來處於法學家與經濟學家的不斷爭論之中，其癥結在於──公司應為法律之產物亦或是某種以公司為外觀特征卻以契約關係為基礎調整各個利益主體之間權利義務關係的一系列契約之安排。如果公司是由鏈接每一個利益相關者的一系列契約的安排所組成，美國各州公司法應當僅提供適用於一般公司的可供參考的示範性原則，而該示範性條款可以依照不同公司之間的契約靈活的加以改變。由於公司章程特別是辦事細則自身的契約屬性以及其能夠直接迅速的實現董事會對於公司事務執行的需求，各州公司法允許公司以植入公司章程條款或辦事細則的方式，自己選擇適合自身需求的公司法規則。而這些允許公司自由“選入”公司法規則的條款，實際上將公司契約理論付諸于司法實踐。
作為美國公司契約關係理論的典型實踐，Smith v. Van Gorkom與ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund案都引發了對以公司章程為途徑減輕管理層個人責任的廣泛討論。前者的論題為，通過修改公司章程排除董事因注意義務而導致之個人賠償責任是否違反公司法中關於受任人義務的強制性規定。如果上述命題被認為合法可行的話，由此引發的更深層次問題是，公司法的受任人義務條款是否為任意性規定從而可以將其從公司法中選掉。不同於前述案件，在ATP案中，董事會並未從公司章程中尋求個人責任的直接減免，其意圖在公司章程中加入訴訟成本轉嫁條款(Fee-shifting Provision)或直接制定含有該條款的公司內部治理細則(Fee-shifting Bylaws), 從而使原告股東提出的針對公司內部事務之訴訟在不能獲得法院實質性支持的情況下，承擔被告董事會成員的一切訴訟花費，包括律師費及其他成本。這種訴訟成本轉嫁條款或是公司內部辦事細則，將會改變長久以來的“美國規則(即訴訟各方自行支付己方律師費用)”，進而起到幫助董事們免於遭受大量股東起訴的作用。
基於美國特拉華州時隔30年的兩個典型案例，本文首先探討了引發上述兩次董事責任減免行為的理論基礎，並以此展開對于公司契約理論及其基本議題的論述。以該理論為視角，本文從對Van Gorkom案的討論出發，對以公司章程為手段選掉公司法注意義務行為的合法性進行探討，并以特拉華州一般公司法§102(b)(7)頒布前後該州注意義務的運行效果為借鑒，去查明這一源於美國司法實踐中的制度是否對中國具有借鑒意義。
在ATP 案中，本文以特拉華州地區法院針對訴訟成本轉嫁條款向該州最高法院提出的四項法律適用問題入手，首先對訴訟成本轉嫁條款的法律性質及適用效果進行論述，并進一步針對該條款對股東濫訴的限制作用及其相應的風險性展開分析與比較。由於該訴訟成本轉嫁條款即便在特拉華州也并非自始產生法律效力，本文亦對該條款的有效性及效力範圍進行相應論述。
在結論部分，本文認為前述兩個案例中董事免責條款的功能可以從兩個方面加以思考：在Van Gorkom案中，通過選掉董事注意義務，從而達到平衡董事個人責任的作用；在ATP案中，通過選入雙邊訴訟成本轉嫁的公司辦事細則，從而達到調整股東起訴積極性的作用。其次，由於董事免責機制的缺失成為長久以來困擾中國董事的法律問題，因此文章在最後回歸其寫作的初始之意，即上述來源於美國司法實踐的董事免責條款亦可能會在中國發揮不可替代的作用。

As a controversial issue, the nature of the firm has been argued between legal scholars and economists for a long time. The crux of the controversy is to determine whether the corporation is a legal creature or something is found on the basis of a nexus of contracts which govern the rights and obligations of the parties’ contractual relations under the umbrella of a corporation. If corporations are nothing but a series of contracts between or among every stakeholder of them, state corporation statutes should only provide standard rules suitable for the average corporation which may be modified flexibly as desired by contract. Because the articles of incorporation, especially bylaws are contracts in nature and a direct and fast way for the board to implement corporate demands, state statutes provide that a corporation may elect to be governed by certain statutory provisions, the election of which must be reflected by an appropriate provision in articles of incorporation or bylaws. These “opt in” provisions actually put this theory into practice.
As the typical legal practices of the nexus of contracts theory in Delaware, Smith v. Van Gorkom and ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, both of them have brought about the cyclone for diminishing director’s personal liability. The issue of the former case is should the action be allowed to insert a provision in articles of incorporation so that the corporation can opt out the duty of care for director’s monetary damage. If the method above was considered as a lawful act, another question is whether or not the fiduciary clause belongs to enabling rules so as to be taken away. Unlike the former one, in ATP case, the board didn’t try to diminish their liability directly, instead of it, they intended to insert a fee-shifting provision or create a fee-shifting bylaw that would impose liability for attorneys’ fees and other costs on stockholders bringing unsuccessful internal corporate claims. This fee-shifting provision or bylaw would change the American Rule (that each party is responsible for paying its own attorney’s fees) to help directors to avoid suffering massive lawsuits.
Based on two typical cases whose occurrence time has spaced about 30 years in Delaware, from the outset, this thesis discusses the basic theories of the cases and then expounds the nexus of contracts theory as well as the fundamental issues of it. Further, starting from Van Gorkom, this thesis is going to test the reasonableness of opting out director’s duty of care through the articles of incorporation. Moreover, through the comparison of legal efficacy before and after §102(b)(7) of DGCL became effective, to find out whether this legal practice in America has referential value for China.
In ATP case, this thesis will begin with four questions of law that the District Court certified to the Supreme Court of Delaware. Initially, to discuss the nature and effect of fee-shifting provision. Thereafter, to probe the effect of the fee-shifting provision to deter litigation and its legal risks correspondingly. Because the fee-shifting provisions are not per se valid even in Delaware, this thesis also provides relative legal opinions of it to interpret its scope of application.
In conclusion,this thesis argues that the functions of director’s exculpatory clause in the two cases can be thought into two aspects: in Van Gorkom case─through opting out director’s duty of care─to balance the level of director’s personal liability; in ATP case─through opting in the bilateral fee-shifting bylaw—to adjust the lawsuit activity of shareholder lawsuits. Because the deficiency of director’s exemption mechanism which has plagued the Chinese directors for a long time, Ultimately, this thesis comes back to its original intent to make a point that the exculpatory clauses from the United States may play an irreplaceable role in China.

Table of Contents	
Abstract	I
中文摘要	III
Acknowledgements	V
Table of Contents	VII
List of Tables	XI
List of Figures	XII
Chapter I Introduction	1
1 Background and Source	1
2 Motivation and Purpose	3
3 Research Methods	4
4 Research Structure and Process	5
Chapter II The Nexus of Contracts Theory	7
1 Basic Theories of Nexus-of-Contracts	8
1.1 Contract Theory	8
1.2 The Nature of the Firm	9
1.3 Objections to Coase	11
2 The Meaning of Nexus of Contracts Theory	12
2.1 The Different Meanings of Contract between Economists and Legal Scholars	12
2.2 The Implication of Nexus-of-Contracts	13
3 The Fundamental Issues of Nexus of Contracts Theory	14
3.1 Why We Need Corporate Law Rather Than Contracts	14
3.2 The Classification of Corporate Rules	16
3.2.1 Enabling Rules, Suppletory rules and Mandatory rules	17
3.2.2 Structural Rules, Distributional Rules and Fiduciary Rules	17
3.3 To What Extent Should Corporations Be Allowed to Opt out the Rules	18
4 How Delaware Put the Nexus-of-contracts Theory into Practice: The Nature of Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws	21
4.1 The Articles of Incorporation Approach	22
4.2 The Bylaw Approach	23
Chapter III Opting out Director’s Duty of Care	25
1 Brief History of Opting Out Director’s Duty of Care	25
1.1 Van Gorkom—The Blasting Fuse for Opting Out Director’s Duty of Care	25
1.1.1 Facts and Judgment	26
1.1.2 Defense of Premium	27
1.1.3 Defense of “Market Test”	28
1.1.4 Defense of Suffering Lawsuits	29
1.1.5 Defense by Shareholders’ “Overwhelming” Vote	29
1.1.6 Defense of Business Judgment Rule	30
1.1.7 The reasons Smith v. Van Gorkom became the Blasting Fuse for Opting Out Director’s Duty of Care	31
1.2 Reply from Delaware’s Legislature—Section 102(b)(7)	32
2 Should Director’s Duty of Care Be Allowed to Opt Out	35
2.1 The Argument That Whether Delaware’s Duty of Care Is Dead	35
2.2 Evidence that Delaware’s Duty of Care Is Continued Significant	36
2.2.1 The Preliminary Strands of Survival	37
2.2.2 Procedure and the Association between Care and Loyalty	39
2.2.3 Nonmonetary Relief for Breaches of the Duty of Care in M&A	40
2.3 Reasons for Upholding or Rejecting Opting Out Duty of care	42
2.3.1 Van Gorkom versus Del. §102 (b)(7) As the Balance on Spear & Shield	42
2.3.2 Delaware Section 102 (b)(7) As A Response to Insurance Crisis	44
2.3.3 Delaware Section 102(b)(7) As A Flexible Switch Controlled by Shareholders	46
3 The Substance of Duty of Care and the Exculpatory Provision	47
3.1 What Is Duty of Care in Content	48
3.1.1 The Content of Duty of Care in Eisenberg’s Regard	48
3.1.2 Tests for Duty of Care in Miscellaneous Conditions	57
3.2 Current Status and Comparison of Legislation in America	60
4 Revelations of Opting Out Director’s Duty of Care for China	67
4.1 The Argument That Whether or Not the Fiduciary Clause Is Mandatory	68
4.2 What Is the Extent of Duty of Care That Should Be Eliminated in China	69
Chapter IV Fee-shifting Bylaw──Opting Out the “American Rule”	71
1 Brief History of the Fee-shifting Bylaw	72
1.1 ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund	73
1.1.1 Facts and Background	73
1.1.2 The Judgments of the District Court and the Appellate Court	74
1.2 The Federal District Court’s Four Questions of Law and the Answers	75
1.2.1 Certified Four Questions of Law	75
1.2.2 The Answers from Delaware Supreme Court	76
1.3 The Legal Validity of Fee-shifting Bylaw in Delaware	78
1.3.1 The Facial Validity of a Fee-shifting Bylaw in 2014 and Its Impact	78
1.3.2 The Prohibition of the Fee-shifting Bylaw in 2015	79
2 Should the Fee-shifting Bylaw Be Allowed to Be Adopt For the Corporations	80
2.1 The Reasons Why the Fee-shifting Bylaw Can Be Admissible in America	81
2.1.1 The Costly Trend of Shareholder Lawsuits following M&A	81
2.1.2 Allowing Fee-shifting rules: As One of the Reform Measures Of Shareholder Lawsuits	88
2.1.3 Adopting and Amending Corporate Bylaws to Deter Shareholder Lawsuits	90
2.2 The Risks That Emerged with Fee-shifting Bylaws	92
2.2.1 Directors and Officers May Insulate Themselves from Accountability under the Guise of Unilateral Bylaw Provisions	93
2.2.2 Fee-shifting Bylaw Could Effectively Eliminate Stockholder Rights	94
2.3 Allowing Fee-shifting Bylaws with Limitations That Protect Both Shareholders and Corporations	95
2.3.1 Allowing Stock Corporations to Adopt Fee-Shifting Bylaws with Two Limitations	95
2.3.2 Interpreting Delaware’s Fee-Shifting Ban So That It Does Not Apply to Securities Class Action Lawsuits	99
3 Implications of Adopting Fee-shifting Bylaws to China	102
3.1 The Status Quo of Shareholder Litigation System in China	103
3.1.1 Problems along with Shareholder Derivative Actions	103
3.1.2 The Application of Fee-shifting Bylaw under Article 147 of the Chinese Company Act	106
3.2 The Conception of Adopting Fee-Shifting Bylaws for China	107
3.2.1 The Function on Deterring Frivolous Shareholder Lawsuits of LLC	107
3.2.2 The Function on Stimulating Meritorious Shareholder Lawsuits of Stock Company	108
Chapter V Conclusion	111
1 The Function of Director’s Exculpatory Clause	111
1.1 Opting Out Director’s Duty of Care—Balancing the Level of Director’s Personal Liability	111
1.2 Opting in the Bilateral Fee-shifting Bylaw—Adjusting the Lawsuit Activity of Shareholder Derivative Suit	113
2 The Grounds that the Exculpatory Clause May Play an Irreplaceable Role in China──Using Jia-Hao Lu v. China Securities Regulatory Commission Case as an Instance	114
2.1 Jia-Hao Lu v. China Securities Regulatory Commission—Chinese Exemption System for Directors	115
2.1.1 Jia-Hao Lu v. China Securities Regulatory Commission	115
2.1.2 Chinese Exemption System for Directors	116
2.2 The Deficiency of Director’s Exemption Mechanism in China	119
Bibliography	121
Table of Legislations	133
Table of Cases	136
                                    

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http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0600-0699/0607/Sections/0607.0831.html (2015.12.29).
8. John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L. J. (2012), available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11027&context=ilj (2016.4.2).
9. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG (2013), available at
https://casetext.com/case/koehler-v-netspend-holdings-inc.(2015.12.30).
10. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.30(e) (2000), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20080618091347_large.pdf (2015.12.29).
11. Morgenson, Gretchen, Shareholders, Disarmed by a Delaware Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/business/shareholders-disarmed-by-a-delaware-court.html (2016.4.2).
12. Mueller R.O. et al., Gibson Dunn Discusses Supreme Court of Delaware Case Upholding Fee-Shifting Bylaws, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 16, 2014), available at http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2014/05/16/gibson-dunn-discusses-supreme-court-of-delaware-case-upholding-fee-shifting-bylaws/ (2016.4.2).
13. MUKESH BAJAJ ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES: THE REAL COSTS OF U.S. SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION (Feb. 2014), available at: http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites1/EconomicConsequences_Web.pdf (2016.4.2).
14. NEVADA REVISED STATUTES §78.138(7), available at
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-078.html#NRS078Sec138 (2015.12.30).
15. NEW JERSEY REV. STAT. §14A: 2-7 (3), available at
http://law.justia.com/codes/new-jersey/2014/title-14a/section-14a-2-7/ (2015.12.29).
16. NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW §402(b), available at
http://codes.findlaw.com/ny/business-corporation-law/bsc-sect-402.html (2015.12.29).
17. OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION 1 (2014). available at
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18. PENNSYLVANIA CORPORATIONS AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS §1713, available at http://law.justia.com/codes/pennsylvania/2010/title-15/chapter-17/1713/ (2015.12. 29).
19. REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON §23B.09.320, available at
http://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=23B.08.320 (2015.12.30).
20. TEXAS BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS CODE §7.001, available at
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/BO/htm/BO.7.htm (2015.12.29).
21. UTAH REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT §16-10a-841(1), available at
http://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title16/Chapter10A/16-10a-S841.html?v=C16-10a-S841_1800010118000101 (2015.12.30).
22. Valerio Berman, Investors Try to Undo Damage in Delaware, as Eager Companies Shift Costs of Lawsuits to Plaintiffs, (Nov. 2014), available at
http://www.bermandevalerio.com/9-news/recent-developments/243-investors-try-to-undo-damage-in-delaware-as-eager-companies-shift-costs-of-lawsuits-to-plaintiffs (2016.4.2).
D. Chinese Literature
1. Hao Zhang & Zhendong Li, A Discussion on the Exemption Mechanism of Director’s Liability, 23 JOURNAL OF CHONGQING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY (SOCIAL SCIENCE EDITION) (2006). 張昊李震東，論董事責任的豁免機制，重慶工商大學學報（社會科學版），第23卷，2006年8月。
2. Huang Hui, Shareholder Derivative Lawsuits in China: An Empirical Study and Reform Proposals, 1 RENMIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 236 (2014). 黃輝，中國股東派生訴訟制度：實證研究及完善建議，人大法律評論，2014 (1).
3. Luo Peixin, CONTRACTUAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW, (PEKING UNIVERSITY PRESS 2004). L羅培新，公司法的合同解釋，北京大學出版社，2004年4月。
4. Luo Peixin, The Boundary of Mandatory Provision and Voluntary Provision of Company law: In the perspective of Nomological Framework, 4 CHINA LEGAL SCIENCE 73 (2014). 羅培新，公司法強制性與任意性邊界之厘定：一個法理分析框架，中國法學，2007年第4期。
5. Shi Tiantao, CORPORATION LAW, (LAW PRESS CHINA 2014). 施天濤，公司法論，法律出版社，2014年7月。

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