本研究旨在探討美國強制採用XBRL格式申報財務報表是否能有效提升經理人薪酬與公司績效的連結程度(即薪酬績效敏感性)。過去研究指出，代理問題越嚴重的公司，經理人薪酬與公司績效連結性越低。強制採用XBRL後，除了降低資訊處理成本，可提供報表使用者更有效率地進行跨公司及跨產業的分析比較，增加資訊透明度，有助於減少代理問題，進而增加經理人薪酬績效敏感性。本研究以2006~2014年之美國上市公司為研究樣本，實證結果證實經理人薪酬績效敏感性於XBRL採用後有顯著的提升。

In this study, we examine whether XBRL disclosure effectively increases the degree of linkage between manager compensation and company performance (i.e., pay performance sensitivity) for firms during SEC-mandated years. Past research has pointed out that the more serious the agency problem, the lower the link between manager compensation and company performance. After the SEC mandated firms to adopt XBRL, in addition to reducing the cost of information processing, cross-company and cross-industry analyses and comparisons became more efficient, information transparency was increased, agency problems were reduced, and managerial pay performance sensitivity was thus increased. In this study, US listed companies from 2006 to 2014 were used as the research sample. Overall, the evidence suggests that XBRL adoption results in a great improvement to managerial pay performance sensitivity.

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