本文主要在探討產業間或產業內之董事會兼職對於公司多角化折價的影響。本篇研究試圖將多角化折價與董事會兼職做出連結，並提出下列假說:產業內的董事會兼職能降低多角化折價；產業間的董事會兼職，反而會造成公司多角化折價之惡化。實證結果符合預期假說:產業內的董事會兼職有助於減少多角化折價；而產業間的董事會兼職則加劇角化折價。此外本研究也發現兼職人員的職位與數量亦會顯著影響公司多角化折價。

This paper investigates the impact intra-industry and inter-industry board interlock on corporate diversification. I expect the background of interlocking directorates, whether they are in the related industry, affect the quality of managerial oversight and further influence the degree of corporate diversification. My empirical result supports my hypothesis and indicates that Intra-industry board interlock would decrease the diversification discounts and inter-industry boards interlock would increase the diversification discounts. Besides, I also find that the number of board seats held by one director in intra-industry and the interlocking position are associated to diversification discounts.

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