本研究旨在探討CEO貪婪對非GAAP盈餘（Non-GAAP Earnings）發布與其特性的影響。非GAAP盈餘是管理階層向投資人傳遞資訊、公司績效和溝通的管道，但同時非GAAP盈餘的決定也富有裁決空間及彈性。當貪婪的CEO致力於追逐個人財富及名聲，其可能透過高於GAAP盈餘的非GAAP盈餘來達成目的，且貪婪CEO發佈的非GAAP盈餘高於GAAP盈餘的幅度愈大。此外，貪婪的CEO也可能為達成不同的目的而選擇性地排除持續性項目，若貪婪的CEO為了自利，會排除較具持續性的項目，來獲得更高的非GAAP盈餘，使得非GAAP盈餘的品質較低；但若貪婪的CEO是為了建立其在人力資本市場的價值與良好名聲，則會選擇排除較不具持續性項目，使非GAAP盈餘更具資訊性。本研究結果顯示CEO貪婪程度與發布比GAAP盈餘更高之非GAAP盈餘可能性呈正相關，也與排除盈餘減少項目的幅度呈正相關。本研究也發現貪婪CEO從GAAP盈餘中排除的項目較不具持續性，亦即非GAAP盈餘的品質較好。

This study aims to examine the impact of CEO greed on the release and characteristics of non-GAAP earnings. Non-GAAP earnings serve as a channel for management to communicate company performance with investors. However, the determination of non-GAAP earnings allows for discretion and flexibility. When a greedy CEO is driven by personal wealth and reputation, they may use non-GAAP earnings that exceed GAAP earnings to achieve their goals, resulting in a larger difference between non-GAAP and GAAP earnings. Additionally, a greedy CEO may selectively exclude certain items to achieve different objectives. If a greedy CEO acts in their own self-interest, they may exclude more persistent items to obtain higher non-GAAP earnings, resulting in lower quality. However, if a greedy CEO aims to build their value and reputation in the capital market, they may choose to exclude less persistent items, making non-GAAP earnings more informative. The study finds a positive relationship between CEO greed and the likelihood of releasing non-GAAP earnings higher than GAAP earnings, as well as a positive relationship between CEO greed and the magnitude of earnings-decreasing exclusion items. Greedy CEOs tend to exclude less persistent items, indicating better quality non-GAAP earnings. The study contributes to the literature on greed, showing that it does not always have negative consequences but can also have positive effects on companies and investors. The study also extends previous research on the impact of CEO characteristics on company policies and performance. Furthermore, it helps external investors understand that non-GAAP earnings can be informative, as greedy CEOs use them to express their perception of true company performance.

Abdel-Meguid, A., J. N. Jennings, K. J. Olsen, and M. T. Soliman. 2021. The impact of the CEO's personal narcissism on non-GAAP narnings. The Accounting Review 96 (3): 1-25.
Badertscher, B. A. 2011. Overvaluation and the choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms. The Accounting Review 86 (5): 1491-1518.
Balot, R. K. 2001. Greed and injustice in classical Athens: Princeton University Press.
Bentley, J. W., T. Christensen, K. Gee, and B. Whipple. 2018. Disentangling managers’ and analysts’ non-GAAP reporting. Journal of Accounting Research 56 (4): 1039–1081.
Bhattacharya, N., E. L. Black, T. E. Christensen, and C. R. Larson. 2003. Assessing the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 36 (1-3): 285-319.
Black, D. E., T. E. Christensen, J. T. Ciesielski, and B. C. Whipple. 2021. Non‐GAAP earnings: A consistency and comparability crisis? Contemporary Accounting Research 38 (3): 1712-1747.
Black, E. L., T. E. Christensen, T. Taylor Joo, and R. Schmardebeck. 2017. The relation between earnings management and non‐GAAP reporting. Contemporary Accounting Research 34 (2): 750-782.
Bradshaw, M. T., and R. G. Sloan. 2002. GAAP versus the street: An empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40 (1): 41-66.
Bruhn, J. G., and J. Lowrey. 2012. The good and bad about greed: How the manifestations of greed can be used to improve organizational and individual behavior and performance. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research 64 (2): 136.
Carpenter, M. A., and W. G. Sanders. 2002. Top management team compensation: The missing link between CEO pay and firm performance? Strategic Management Journal 23 (4): 367-375.
Cassill, D., and A. Watkins. 2005. Mogul games: In defense of inequality as an evolutionary strategy to cope with multiple agents of selection. Evolutionary Psychology and Economic Theory 7 : 35-59.
Chatterjee, A., and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. It's all about me: Narcissistic chief executive officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 52 (3): 351-386.
Christensen, T. E., E. Gomez, M. Ma, and J. Pan. 2021. Analysts’ role in shaping non-GAAP reporting: evidence from a natural experiment. Review of Accounting Studies 26 (1): 172-217.
Chu, J., P. M. Dechow, K. W. Hui, and A. Y. Wang. 2019. Maintaining a reputation for consistently beating earnings expectations and the slippery slope to earnings manipulation. Contemporary Accounting Research 36 (4):1966-1998.
Core, J., and W. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (2): 151-184.
Curtis, A. B., S. E. McVay, and B. C. Whipple. 2014. The disclosure of non-GAAP earnings information in the presence of transitory gains. The Accounting Review 89 (3): 933-958.
Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management science 58 (7): 1229-1248.
Doyle, J. T., J. N. Jennings, and M. T. Soliman. 2013. Do managers define non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (1): 40-56.
Doyle, J. T., R. J. Lundholm, and M. T. Soliman. 2003. The predictive value of expenses excluded from pro forma earnings. Review of Accounting Studies 8 (2): 145-174.
Elstein, A. 2001. Waste management excludes some expenses in accounting. The Wall Street Journal (August 23).
Frankel, R., S. McVay, and M. Soliman. 2011. Non-GAAP earnings and board independence. Review of Accounting Studies 16 (4): 719-744.
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and M. Puri. 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (1): 103-121.
Guest, N. M., S. Kothari, and R. Pozen. 2018. High non-GAAP earnings predict abnormally high CEO pay. Working Paper :Cornell University, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management
Guest, N. M., S. Kothari, and R. C. Pozen. 2022. Why do large positive non-GAAP earnings adjustments predict abnormally high CEO pay? The Accounting Review 97 (6): 297-326.
Harris, J. D. 2009. What’s wrong with executive compensation? Journal of Business Ethics 85 (1): 147-156.
Haynes, K. T., J. T. Campbell, and M. A. Hitt. 2010. Greed, hubris and board power: effects on firm outcomes. Academy of Management Proceedings 2010 (1):1-6.
Haynes, K. T., M. Josefy, and M. A. Hitt. 2015. Tipping point: Managers’ self-interest, greed, and altruism. Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies 22 (3): 265-279.
Haynes, K., J. T. Campbell, and M. A. Hitt. 2017. When more is not enough: Executive greed and its influence on shareholder wealth. Journal of Management 43 (2): 555-584.
Hill, C. W., and P. Phan. 1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal 34 (3): 707-717.
Hitt, M., and K. T. Haynes. 2018. CEO overpayment and underpayment: executives, governance and institutions. Management Research 16 (1): 38-46.
Hooghiemstra, R., Y. F. Kuang, and B. Qin. 2017. Does obfuscating excessive CEO pay work? The influence of remuneration report readability on say-on-pay votes. Accounting and Business Research 47 (6): 695-729.
Hsu, H.-W. 2022. CEO educational backgrounds and non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Investment Management and Financial Innovations 19(3): 167-175.
Isidro, H., and A. Marques. 2013. The effects of compensation and board quality on non-GAAP disclosures in Europe. The International Journal of Accounting 48 (3): 289-317.
Jebran, K., S. Chen, and W. Cai. 2022. Excess of everything is bad: CEO greed and corporate policies. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 59 (4): 1577-1607.
Jennings, R., and A. Marques. 2011. The joint effects of corporate governance and regulation on the disclosure of manager‐adjusted non‐GAAP earnings in the US. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 38 (3‐4): 364-394.
Jennings, R., and A. C. Marques. 2007. The impact of corporate governance on the disclosure of manager-adjusted non-GAAP earnings.Working Paper, University of texas at Austin.
Jo, K. M., and S. Yang. 2020. SEC Comment letters on firms' use of non-GAAP Measures: The Determinants and Firms' Responses. Accounting Horizons 34 (2): 167-184.
Judge, T. A., R. F. Piccolo, and T. Kosalka. 2009. The bright and dark sides of leader traits: A review and theoretical extension of the leader trait paradigm. The Leadership Quarterly 20 (6): 855-875.
Kyung, H., J. Ng, and Y. G. Yang. 2021. Does the use of non‐GAAP earnings in compensation contracts lead to excessive CEO compensation? Efficient contracting versus managerial power. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 48 (5-6): 841-868.
Leung, E., and D. Veenman. 2018. Non‐GAAP earnings disclosure in loss firms. Journal of Accounting Research 56 (4): 1083-1137.
Liesman, S., and J. Weil. 2001. Different views of ‘special items’ lead to various figures for S&P 500 profit. Wall Street Journal.
Lont, D. H., D. Ranasinghe, and H. Roberts. 2020. Non-GAAP Disclosures and CEO Pay Levels. The International Journal of Accounting 55 (04): 2050016.
Malmendier, U., and G. Tate. 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The journal of finance 60 (6): 2661-2700.
McClelland, D. C. 1975. Power:The inner experience: Irvington.
Melleuish, G. 2009. Greed is great. Institute of Public Affairs Review: A Quarterly Review of Politics and Public Affairs 61 (2): 22-24.
Papatheodorou, A., J. Rosselló, and H. Xiao. 2010. Global economic crisis and tourism: Consequences and perspectives. Journal of Travel Research 49 (1): 39-45.
Petrenko, O. V., F. Aime, J. Ridge, and A. Hill. 2016. Corporate social responsibility or CEO narcissism? CSR motivations and organizational performance. Strategic management journal 37 (2): 262-279.
Posner, E. A. 2003. The jurisprudence of greed. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (3): 1097-1133.
Ribeiro, A., Y. Shan, and S. Taylor. 2019. Non‐GAAP earnings and the earnings quality trade‐off. Abacus 55 (1): 6-41.
Saad, G. 2007. The evolutionary bases of consumption: Psychology Press.
Sajko, M., C. Boone, and T. Buyl. 2021. CEO greed, corporate social responsibility, and organizational resilience to systemic shocks. Journal of Management 47 (4): 957-992.
Seuntjens, T. G., M. Zeelenberg, N. Van de Ven, and S. M. Breugelmans. 2015a. Dispositional greed. Journal of personality and social psychology 108 (6): 917.
Seuntjens, T. G., M. Zeelenberg, S. M. Breugelmans, and N. Van de Ven. 2015b. Defining greed. British Journal of Psychology 106 (3): 505-525.
Smith, R. G. 2003. Serious fraud in Australia and New Zealand: Australian Institute of Criminology Canberra, Australia.
Vergne, J.-P., G. Wernicke, and S. Brenner. 2018. Signal incongruence and its consequences: A study of media disapproval and CEO overcompensation. Organization Science 29 (5): 796-817.
Wade, J. B., C. A. O'Reilly III, and T. G. Pollock. 2006. Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: Fairness and executive compensation. Organization Science 17 (5): 527-544.
Wang, L., D. Malhotra, and J. K. Murnighan. 2011. Economics education and greed. Academy of Management Learning and Education 10 (4): 643-660.
Wang, L., and J. K. Murnighan. 2011. On greed. Academy of Management Annals 5 (1): 279-316.
Williams, W. 2000. Greed versus compassion.Working Paper:George Mason University
Yermack, D. 2006. Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns. Journal of Financial Economics 80 (1): 211-242.
Young, S. 2014. The drivers, consequences and policy implications of non-GAAP earnings reporting. Accounting and Business Research 44 (4): 444-465.